

Democratization as development aid in Mozambique

-which role does education for citizenship play?

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Focus and research questions

The object of this thesis is to study the process of democratization in Mozambique and the role that education for citizenship can play in this context. Prior to focusing on the concept of education for citizenship, however, I need to outline and discuss the context within which this education is to be placed. Hence, I need to explore the contemporary Mozambican society, and the historical events contributing to the present level of democracy in the country. At present, the development aid agents play a decisive part in the development of Mozambique. I therefore also intend to investigate the partnership between Mozambique and its donors. This constitutes a thesis of three connected and overlapping research questions, two of which are subordinate to the last one. These are as follows:

I will first investigate the present Mozambican democracy by focusing on the country's recent history, and I explore my first research question:

What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?

I then explore the aid relationship between Mozambique and its donors and some trends in the development aid policy. The main focus will be on the dilemma of conditionalities within the development aid partnership, as I address my next research question:

What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?

By investigating these two sub questions, I intend to provide a basis for the understanding of the main concern of this thesis. It is of interest to explore what role education for citizenship could play, and which role it *does* play, in the context of democratization in Mozambique. This is the focus of my final and main research question:

Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?

All questions will be explored through a combination of theoretical and empirical sources.

Methodology

This study is a case study that consists of one theoretical part of literature studies and one empirical part of qualitative interviews from my fieldwork in Mozambique. The methodological implications are discussed in chapter 2. The literature review is outlined in chapters 3-6: Mozambique's history is outlined to provide an understanding of the present conditions for democratization (chapter 3). The aid relationship and its inherent dilemma of conditionality are discussed (chapter 4). The term democracy and the problem of its transfer are considered, and the concept of education for citizenship is discussed (chapters 5 and 6, respectively). This theoretical outline constitutes a beginning of the discussions concerning my research questions, which are additionally addressed through the analysis of empirical data in chapter 7.

My empirical data were collected during a field study in Mozambique. By a convenience sample I conducted 15 qualitative semi-structured and open-ended interviews. They have been analyzed according to categories detected in the theoretical material and in the empirical data itself.

Sources and data

This study draws on a variation of different disciplines: The historical outline and the democracy theory are part of the tradition of political science; the discussions concerning education are within the tradition of science of education, and partly relying on the subject area of critical pedagogy. The outline of the aid relationship is based on the growing amount of literature on the field, as well as other research done on the field of education and development in Mozambique. I have additionally made use of international and national policy documents and statistics.

The empirical data have been collected through my interviews with different stakeholders within the education sector in Mozambique. This data rely on information received from the government and governmental institutions, universities, international and bilateral development aid partners and representatives for civil society -mainly non-governmental institutions working with democratization and/or education in Mozambique.

Conclusions

In a study like this, clear and straightforward conclusions are difficult to uphold. There are nevertheless some tendencies that I have found interesting. When exploring my first research question *What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?*, I have support from literature studies when claiming that Mozambique's present democracy is characterized by people's lack of democratic experience. My empirical data show similar results, as there are many obstacles to democracy in the present Mozambican society that might be explained through this lack of democratic experience. I argue that this lack of democratic experience leads to a need for information and increased participation, and that education for citizenship could play an important role here.

When it comes to the concrete transition into democracy, the term democracy is first emphasised in the literature review. Democracy theorists have divergent understandings of the term, and it can be applied differently to different contexts. There are implications of the African context that need to be taken into consideration when a democracy is to be created in Mozambique. Nevertheless, my empirical data show that the Mozambican transition into democracy can in many ways be characterized as a pure transfer of a Western-type democracy. My informants lament this and appeal for a democracy adjusted to the Mozambican context.

This democracy-transfer is maintained partly through the conditionalities tied to aid. The donor community has a powerful impact on the Mozambican society, and this brings me to my second research question: *What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?* There is no doubt that the external partners can play an important role in encouraging and securing a democratic development. But literature shows that development aid is an issue of great controversies, as conditionalities are part and parcel of the development aid relationship. I have studied the education sector, and the new *Sector Wide Approach* (SWAp) is warmly welcomed in this context. It seems to entail positive features that deals with some of the problems inherent in the aid relationship, to provide good means for democratization. But this depends on whether the development aid partnership functions according to its intentions, and reality shows that it does not. My empirical data concord with this: my informants view the SWAp as positive for the creation of a genuine partnership. But they also

point to a lot of difficulties within the SWAp. There are divergent understandings and cultural differences within the partnership. Conditionalities are present, and a lack of trust characterizes the relationship. One might question to what degree one can call this relationship democratic, and a genuine partnership. This situation illustrates the need for increased Mozambican ownership to policy planning, and increased participation by the ordinary Mozambicans. I argue that education for citizenship could be instrumental in this respect.

Through the discussions concerning my two first research questions, I have provided a basis understanding for the exploration of my last research question. I have argued that the Mozambican democracy is still not consolidated, that the development aid partnership does not necessarily contribute positively in this context, and that education for citizenship could be instrumental in this situation. The question is, however, what this concept of education for citizenship could be, and how it functions in Mozambique. Hence, my final and main research question becomes: *Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?* The theoretical outline provided shows that there are at least two aspects of education relevant in this context. Education for citizenship will include socialization into the political culture of a democratic society, through conveyance of common values. This is important, as education for citizenship plays a role when it comes to nation building, especially in a multiethnic society like Mozambique. Education is also put forward as a change agent, through emphasis on the critical aspect of education for citizenship. Critical consciousness is important, as people are to create, and participate in, democracy. In my empirical data there is a tendency of strong emphasis on the aspect of socialization. This might be no surprise, considering that Mozambique has been in a state of war and conflicts for a long time. The need for co-existence and unity demands common values and common effort. There was a clear tendency in my material that the focus on co-existence repressed the emphasis on the critical aspect. This resulted in a somewhat naïve view of critical consciousness, and in my opinion this shows that there is a lack of awareness concerning the importance of the critical aspect.

I am concerned that this might have negative impact on the Mozambican education for citizenship's ability to contribute to democratization. I believe that the critical aspect is important for the democratic development of Mozambique; for the Mozambican people's ability to influence their own society and its just development. Hence, the

present situation in Mozambique makes it easier, to some extent, to understand the posing of conditionalities, as the critical aspect might be encouraged by the external partners to promote a democratic development. My material has nevertheless showed that there is a question to what degree the Mozambican society is ready for these changes at this point. I am thus not of the opinion that education for citizenship will solve all the problems in Mozambique, or that the critical aspect of education could be forced upon them. I nevertheless insist on the importance of awareness concerning this matter in the situation that Mozambique is in. If so, the critical aspect of education for citizenship could be a tool for the Mozambican people to influence not only their own government, but also the powerful development agents that have such a great impact on their country.

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Thank you!

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADEA – Association for the Development of Education in Africa

ANC – African National Congress

CIDA – Canadian International Development Agency

DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency

DFID – Department for International Development

EFA – Education for All

(E)SAP – (Economic) Structural Adjustment Programs

ESSP – Education Sector Strategic Plan

EU – European Union

FTI – Fast Track Initiative

Frelimo – Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; the Mozambican liberation front

HDI – Human Development Index

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INDE – Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educação; Institute for Educational Development

NESH – Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora

NAI – Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Nordic African Institute

NGO – Non-governmental Organisation

PARPA – Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta; Plan of action to reduce absolute poverty, Mozambique's PRSP

PRSP – Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Renamo – Resistência Nacional Moçambicana; Mozambique National Resistance

SIDA – Swedish International Development Agency

SWAp – Sector Wide Approach

UEM – Universidade Eduardo Mondlane; Eduardo Mondlane University

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA – The United Nations Population Fund

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

WFP – World Food Programme

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Reasons for my choice of theme

When I first started working on this thesis, I wanted to do a work on development aid and education in an African country. I have always found democracy-theory interesting, and democratization is heavily emphasized on the development aid agenda. To me as an educationist, focus on the subject of education for citizenship was natural in this context, as I am of the opinion that education might play an important role in the process of democratization.

Through studies at *Universidade do Algarve* in Portugal I learned some Portuguese, and it seemed natural for me to carry out my fieldwork in an African Portuguese-speaking country. I found the history and present situation in Mozambique very interesting, and suitable for my purposes. I therefore chose to go to Maputo to do my fieldwork. As I have chosen to write this thesis in English, it is mainly because I feel it as an obligation to the people that I have talked to in Mozambique, and also because I am thinking that other non-Norwegians might have interest in this thesis.

1.2 Background for my theme

The *Human Development Report* from 2004 ranks Mozambique as number 171 on the Human Development Index (HDI¹), and such placing it at the bottom of the ranking with the countries of low human development (United Nations Development Programme 2004:146). This situation has made Mozambique extremely dependent on development aid, and there is a wide range of external agents involved in the policy making in Mozambique (Plank 1993). One important focus on the area of development aid today is democratization and good governance -the last two decades of the 20th century have been called the “third wave” of democratization (United Nations

¹ “The human development index (HDI) focuses on three measurable dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living (...). Thus it combines measures of life expectancy, school enrolment, literacy and income to allow a broader view of a country’s development than does income alone.” (United Nations Development Programme 2004:128).

2002:14). Mozambique is one of the countries that recently have gone through great changes on their way to democracy, with its third elections in December 2004.

Education is emphasized on the development agenda; it is an important factor for poverty reduction, and also for democratization (Harber 2002:267). But not any education will contribute to democratization (Harber 2002:268). Mozambique has recently introduced a new subject of education for citizenship. I find it interesting to study education for citizenship, which role it could play, and which role it *does* play in the Mozambican context –and that is the main focus of this thesis.

However, there are some issues that need to be outlined and discussed before I can focus on the concept of education for citizenship. I need to provide a backdrop for the context within which this education is to be placed. This means that I need to explore the contemporary Mozambican context, and the historical events contributing to the present level of democracy in the country. I also need to investigate the development aid partnership between Mozambique and its donors, as this plays a decisive part in the development of Mozambique. I therefore get a thesis of three overlapping research questions, two of which are subordinate to the last one. These are as follows:

1.3 Research questions

I will first investigate the present democracy in Mozambique and the transition it goes through, and my first research question becomes:

What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?

This research question will be addressed by examining literature on the recent history of Mozambique, from colonial times until the present changes into multi-party democracy. I have also focused on this question during my interviews, and the research question will therefore be investigated further through my empirical data and analysis.

I then investigate the aid relationship between Mozambique and its donors and some trends in the development aid policy, to be able to explore my next research question:

What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?

Through literature studies the development aid relationship is investigated, and the dilemma of aid conditionality within the education sector will be emphasized. My respondents provide additional empirical information, contributing to the exploration of my second research question.

By investigating these two sub questions, I intend to provide a basis for the understanding of the main concern of this thesis: The concept of education for citizenship in the context of democratization. I argue that education is needed in the present situation in Mozambique, and I find it interesting to explore further the concept of education for citizenship connected to this. It is of interest to explore what role it could play, and which role it *does* play, in this context. This is the focus of my final and main research question:

Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?

This question is also first addressed through a theoretical discussion on the nature of education and the roles that education for citizenship could play. Through the empirical data my informants contribute to an understanding of how this functions in Mozambique.

1.4 Conceptualizations and limitations

Within this thesis, there are frequently used terms that need to be further conceptualized. This is done throughout the text as they appear, but it can be helpful to introduce a few of them at this point, as well. There is also a need to limit the area of investigation of this project, to fit within the framework of a master thesis. These conceptualizations contribute to the needed limitation of my thesis.

I settle with a definition of the term *democracy* that emphasizes participation by all on an equal basis. I nevertheless criticize a static view of the term democracy and argue that it should be adjusted to its context. This is not an attempt to answer what kind of democracy Mozambique needs, or in which way it should be implemented. I rather intend to reveal some of the characteristics of this process of democratization, without forwarding any conclusive remedies.

The present Mozambican democracy is to be understood as the present situation in the Mozambican society, with the latest changes into democracy. Furthermore, the term also entails the historical experiences of the Mozambican people contributing to the level of democratic consciousness at present.

The development aid partnership is to be seen as the partnership between the Mozambican government and its international and bilateral donors, the UN agencies, the World Bank, and civil society. Even though I am of the opinion that I can provide a somewhat consistent overview of the partnership within the education sector, I emphasize that all partners are not included in my investigation. Hence, this study is not to be seen as a detailed evaluation of the development aid partnership in Mozambique. My investigations do not go deeply into specific development aid programmes, but rather provide an overview of the general atmosphere of the development aid partnership within the education sector.

The theoretical outline shows that in my view the concept of *Education for citizenship* entails an aspect of creating critical consciousness as well as an aspect of socialization and the conveyance of common values. Within the limits of this master thesis, I am not able to go into the concrete content of the new subject of education for citizenship in Mozambican schools, but I rather discuss the concept and my informants' understandings of the term in general.

1.5 The structure of the thesis

I start out in *chapter 2* by outlining my methodological choices. I sketch the implications of a case study, and define my specific case. First, the preparations for my fieldwork are addressed -organizing an interview guide and contacting informants that were interesting to me. I then go on to discuss the qualitative interview. This setting is a special interaction between respondent and researcher, and has ethical and methodical implications. I also discuss the process of analysis and the categorization of themes in my empirical data. Throughout the whole chapter I have my own fieldwork in mind and I finally evaluate its validity and reliability. The ethical implications of doing research, in particular within a cross-cultural context, are heavily emphasized.

In *chapter 3* the Mozambican historical background is outlined, to clarify the setting of my thesis, and to provide a backdrop to the present situation in the country. With this historical sketch, I intend to provide a picture of Mozambique as a country with, historically and present, numerous challenges; a country with a lack of democratic experience in need of democratization and education for citizenship. This is an important pre-understanding for the further investigation of the role that education for citizenship can play in Mozambique at present.

The development aid agents also play a vital role in the development of Mozambique. It is of utmost concern in which way the external partners, who advocate the democratic principles, *appear* in the political cooperation with Mozambique. In *chapter 4* I therefore discuss the aid relationship, and its role on the democracy arena. Connected to this is the dilemma of conditionality. The *Sector Wide Approach* (SWAp) and this approach's intentions to create a partnership between the different stakeholders, and to promote increased local ownership, are longed-for in this context. I discuss that the SWAp is criticized for not fulfilling its intentions, but rather continuing or maybe even deteriorating the situation of aid linked to conditionality. I explore what impact this has on the democratization process in Mozambique, and ask whether the aid relationship is an obstacle to the democratization of Mozambique, or whether it can contribute to a democratic development. I argue that the Mozambican people need to be able to influence and control the impact that the powerful development aid agents have on the development of their country, and here education for citizenship has a role to play.

The discussions to follow, concerning democratization and education for citizenship, demand further focus on the concept of democracy. In *chapter 5* the origin and transformation of the term is addressed, and I ask whether it is necessarily the Western, liberal understanding of the term, that is the only one valid. I also question whether this understanding, which is encouraged by the donor partners, is transferable to the African context. I proceed to explain some of the reasons why a pure transfer of democracy to Africa is difficult, due to the cultural differences between the West and the "traditional African societies". Also the present African context with huge problems of poverty stands as an obstacle for the process of democratization in the country. A definition of the term is provided, opening for a contextual understanding of democracy. This definition also emphasizes participation, and participation demands

an informed public. Herein lays an important responsibility for education for citizenship.

In *chapter 6* I finally outline the concept of education for citizenship, and the role that education has in a process of democratization is discussed. This provides a theoretical starting-point for the discussions concerning what role education for citizenship can play in Mozambique. I emphasize that education can function either as an agent of reproduction or and agent for development and change, and that it therefore is of vital importance what kind of education is promoted. I argue that in a democratic society the objectives and values will be those of continued change and improvement. Consequently, education will socialize its citizens into a culture that encompasses the critical aspect. I then go on to outline these aspects connected to education for citizenship. Theoretically, the concept of education for citizenship might be said to play at least two important roles: It should contribute to the creation of a critical consciousness, as I view this as a precondition for the development of a viable democracy. Education for citizenship also plays a role when it comes to the conveyance of common values. The dilemma of the conveyance of values is addressed; both because a pure transfer of values might not be possible, and because the finding of a common basis of values is a difficult matter. Nevertheless, common values are vital for the state-building project, and supposedly even more so in developing countries. Hence, the need for unity and co-effort might lead to another balancing of the two aspects of education in Mozambique than in more developed countries with an older democratic tradition.

This will be addressed in *chapter 7*, as my empiric findings are outlined. I analyze them in the light of the theory presented in the preceding chapters. The structure of chapter 7 is centred on my three research questions, and I complete the exploration of these.

In the final chapter I sum up the investigation of my research questions, and provide some concluding remarks.

2. QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY

While doing scientific investigations, the methodologies used will necessarily be decided by the area of investigation, and the questions asked. I have studied the democratization of Mozambique and the relationship between the partners in the education sector. A quantitative approach would not have provided me with the answers I needed, as I wanted to go deeper into one specific case. A qualitative case study with open-ended qualitative interviews was the suitable tool. In this chapter my methodological choices are outlined, and I discuss methodological and ethical implications of my research project. My specific case is introduced as I focus on the preparation of an interview-guide, the choice of my sample and the completion of my fieldwork (2.1). I sketch the implication of the qualitative interview and my experiences in interaction with the respondents, and also how I conducted the analysis of my empirical data (2.2). The validity and reliability of my research are addressed, with examples of how I have critically evaluated this (2.3). Finally, ethical implications are discussed, especially in the context of a cross-cultural research project (2.4). A final evaluation of the methodological implications is outlined in the summary (2.5).

2.1 The case study

Robert K. Yin defines the case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994:13). A case study will therefore not investigate a matter detached from its context, but rather take its context into account, and emphasize its relevance for the phenomenon studied. There are many ways to study a phenomenon and its context, and Yin (1994:80) claims that the case study makes use of different sources of evidence, and hence, different methodologies. Thus, my case study consists of three different sources: documentation, archival records and interviews. I regarded these sources as the most convenient and worthwhile for my purposes. The document sources I have used are policy declarations, written reports of meetings, administrative documents and other internal documents, formal studies or evaluations of the same “site” under study, and newspaper clippings. I have also used some archival records, providing me with

numbers and facts about Mozambique. I got some of the documentation from my informants, others from my tutor or on internet and in libraries. Nevertheless, my interviews are the source most emphasized, and the source providing me with most information.

2.1.1 Preparations for my fieldwork; the interview guide

When preparing my fieldwork, I started out by reading documents on the Mozambican educational policy and literature on Mozambique in general; its political and historical background. I also read literature about education and development, aid relationship and democratic development. I prepared an interview guide (appendix 1) with my questions divided into three main areas, with specific questions directed to the different stakeholders. The first questions concerned the aid relationship and focused on the SWAp and the cooperation between the different partners. The next questions focused more concretely on the content of the new *Education Sector Strategic Plan* (ESSP) and the new curriculum for education for citizenship. In turn, these questions led to a discussion about democracy and its state in the present Mozambican society.

2.1.2 Choosing my sample

One of the main issues when conducting research is how to choose the sample. Since my thesis focused on a subject involving a quite limited number of persons, some of the people I needed to talk to were given; the sample was strategically chosen and limited to the persons that would provide me with relevant information. Tove Thagaard calls this a “convenience sample” (Thagaard 2002:54, my translation). Frequently, the “snowball technique” (Ryen 2002:90, my translation) made my sample expand; my informants recommended other persons to talk to. As I chose my sample, I was concerned to get a variety of stakeholders represented, both from the donor side, the government side and from civil society. This was important to me, to secure internal validity. The representatives for civil society are from different Mozambican *non-governmental organisations* (NGOs) working with education or democratization, situated in Maputo. I prepared a list of key persons and institutions before I left home, and contacted some of them by e-mail or phone before I left. I preferably wanted to talk to more than one person from each office, to strengthen reliability and internal

validity, but often there was only one person at each office able to answer the questions of my concern. I ended up talking to 15 persons; eight of them becoming my most important sources, providing me important information, and the remaining seven functioning as supporting sources.

2.1.3 Completion of my fieldwork

I undertook my fieldwork in Maputo during a nine weeks period in the spring of 2004. This was my first time in Africa, and my first time in the role of a researcher. I knew I had a lot to learn, not only from the information I would collect, but also culturally and professionally, as a qualitative researcher. During my whole stay in Mozambique I spent much time making appointments. Eventually I discovered that it was better to go to the offices in person, and then get an appointment to get an appointment. Nevertheless, my appointments were often postponed, either to another day, or later that same day.

As I started doing my first interviews, it soon turned out that some of the respondents I had contacted from home were not really that interesting to my thesis. I therefore undertook some interviews that did not provide me with accurate information concerning the main aspects of my thesis, but which gave me general information that helped me validate the information that I got later from more central stakeholders in the process. These first interviews also gave me valuable methodological practice and experience. They made me more secure in the role as a researcher, and gave me time to become familiar with my interview guide so that I got more independent of it. This resulted in making the later interviews more casual and comfortable.

2.2 The qualitative interview

The best way to find out about a phenomenon in the social world is by talking to the people involved. The interview can be seen as a dialogue between partners, but where the interviewer has the control, structuring the conversation and deciding the topics to be discussed. Knowledge is constructed in the interaction between respondent and interviewer (Kvale 1996). Steinar Kvale defines the semi structured life world interview as “an interview whose purpose is to obtain descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena”

(Kvale 1996:5-6). This process is not unproblematic, and as we will see in the following, both methodological and ethical issues must be taken into account.

Interviews can be structured to a greater or lesser degree, from standardized schedules to open interviews based on themes. Normally half-structured, open-ended qualitative interviews are structured according to an interview guide, but are flexible enough to allow unexpected turns in the conversation. This makes the interview situation quite spontaneous and demanding for the researcher. Choices have to be taken along the way, and this is of course easier with experience (Kvale 1996). My interview guide was meant as a check-list, to make sure that the respondents touched upon some of the same areas, but not to be followed in a strict manner.

Many of my respondents were people in high ranks in the Mozambican society. They had busy agendas, and even though they were all very welcoming and friendly to me, I sometimes felt uncomfortable by taking one hour of their valuable time. This forced some stress on me, often making it difficult to ask all the questions I wanted to ask. At times it prevented me from repeating their answers and asking them follow-up questions to secure validity. With some of my respondents I also had the problem that they would not talk about things that was not part of their working area. If I wanted them to reflect on education or democracy in general, some were reluctant to do so. To me it seemed that they were afraid to talk about things that were not part of their professional education, maybe being afraid that they would show their possible ignorance. I tried to make the situation as safe as possible, assuring them that I just wanted their reflections and had no correct answers. This was somehow difficult, as I was very much in the role of a guest and my informants the hosts.

2.2.1 Analysis of data

I transcribed my interviews during my stay in Mozambique and immediately after my return to Norway. Five of my interviews were conducted in Portuguese. I translated these into English, and these citations are therefore marked “my translation”. I felt it was important to do the transcriptions as soon as possible, while the conversations were still fresh in my memory. By the time I finished, I felt I had a good overview of the tendencies in my material, and I decided to put the transcriptions away for a while, to get distance from the material.

After some months I started to do the in-depth analysis of the transcriptions. The analysis had, of course, started earlier, as this is a process going on throughout the whole progression of research. Anne Ryen (2002) claims that it is neither possible, nor desirable, to separate the different stages in the research process. Data managing, categorization and interpretation overlap throughout the whole process. Ryen (2002:147ff) makes account for a procedure of in-depth analysis of raw data. This procedure evolves from the raw data, and throughout the analysis, the amount of data should be reduced. From the transcribed citations, the researcher isolates units of meaning, which (s)he can reduce further to certain categories. All isolated units of meaning are systematized in this way and put into the categories that they belong to. This leads to a continuing process of development and revision of categories. If a unit does not fit into any of the existing categories, a new one has to be created, or an old one must be altered. Eventually one ends up with all raw data systematized into groups of categories and sub-categories, which can be related to, and create, theory. I ended up with a schema with all information put into categories evolving from the interviews. In that way I reduced the amount of data, and it became easier to compare the statements from the different stakeholders and hold it up against relevant theory. A danger with this procedure could be that the categories are part of the researcher's pre-understandings, and that these influence the way one interpret the raw data. The categories should not be created in advance, but rather appear from the material from the field, Ryen claims. Nevertheless, already as one chooses one's theoretical material and the focus of questions in the interview guide, I am of the opinion that one does necessarily have some categories in the back of one's head, and I cannot be sure that the categories found were not influenced by my pre-understandings. According to Hanson's thesis, however, this is part and parcel of all research. Our observations will be influenced by our background knowledge (Phillips 2000:104). Ryen (2002) also reminds us that it is important to keep in mind that the results of the analysis are a construction of the social reality. Another researcher might have found other categories, and hence, the construction that we reach, is only one of many possible.

2.3 Validity of research results

Research entails various types of conclusions and interpretations. Lund (2002) claims that we make causal conclusions, generalizations and conclusions connected to the

relationship between constructs and their indicators. All these conclusions combined answer the research questions and the hypotheses of a project. To make sure that the phenomenon of interest is portrayed in a proper way, it is important that these conclusions, or inferences, are of high quality. They should be said to have a reasonable high degree of security, or *validity* (Lund 2002:85). When I am about to evaluate the validity of my research, I focus on its external validity, internal validity and its construct validity, which also takes reliability into account.

2.3.1 External validity

External validity, or generalization, is an important feature of research and science. Through research on a specific area, the hope is that we can apply our knowledge to other areas or other persons. Some of the criticism against the case study and qualitative methods in general, has been that its results can not be generalized. Yin (1994:10) argues that one has to distinguish between statistical generalizations and analytic generalizations. The latter type of generalizations, the analytic, is the one used on case studies. The empirical results of a case study can be compared with a previously developed theory, and if more cases support the same theory, replication can be claimed. Kvale (1996:233) claims that an analytic generalization is a reasoned evaluation of the degree to which the findings from one study can be used as a guidance to predict what will probably happen in another situation. For me, it has been important to describe the Mozambican situation as exactly as possible, to ensure that my case's context is explicit. In this way, I have intended to make sure that my research results can be critically evaluated and compared with theory, and with research done on the same subject, or on similar cases. Such, I have attempted to secure external validity, and I hope that the results of my study can be transferred to other comparable situations, for developing countries at a similar stage.

2.3.2 Internal validity

Internal validity is often associated with causality. But internal validity can also be connected to the broader problem of validity of inferences (Lund 2002). Throughout a case study, conclusions will be drawn each time a phenomenon cannot be directly observed. It is therefore important that these inferences are always questioned critically

(Yin 1994). Throughout my thesis I make assumptions and conclusions, and these can be said to be more or less valid. When securing internal validity, it is important that the researcher keeps in mind that there are a variety of different interpretations, and hence conclusions, available. The task is to choose the one most probable (Yin 1994). Ryen (2002) argues that internal validity is secured by trying to discard all threats to one's causalities or conclusions. For instance; through literature research I find that there is a tendency of lack of democratic experience in societies similar to Mozambique. Literature also shows that the Mozambican history entails features that might serve as obstacles to democratization. My informants talk about the misunderstandings of the term democracy and the need for information, and I also get information about the Mozambican society as not consolidated in democracy, but rather consistent of undemocratic practices. It is a probable interpretation that there exists a lack of democratic experience in the Mozambican society, on all levels, and this is part of my conclusions in chapter 7. There might be other explanations as well, and these can be seen as threats to my interpretation. One might think that the Mozambicans are not interested in politics or democracy; one might conclude that democracy is not possible or desirable in Mozambique, or even that there is conscious disinformation going on. I have nevertheless attempted to keep an open mind to other interpretations and conclusions than my own, and I have also tried to make sure that there are no unknown factors interfering, when drawing the conclusions that I find the most probable.

2.3.3 Construct validity

Through research we attempt to describe reality, and since we in the social sciences often use visible indicators to measure abstract terms, the question of *construct validity* is extremely important. While explaining the concept of construct validity, Kleven argues that we have no other choice than to construct a bridge between the empiric level, and our theoretic, abstract level of terms and theories, by using *conceptualizations* (Kleven 2002: 141, my translation). The main issue is to what extent there is coherence between the theoretical definition of the term, and the way it has been conceptualized. Since this thesis is very much about the different understandings of terms like democracy and education for citizenship, it has been difficult to conceptualize these terms in advance. One objective of this thesis has been to investigate the different conceptualizations that exist. On this point I have

nevertheless been clear, and as I for instance have talked to my respondents about democracy, I have emphasized that I view this term as context-bound, and that I am interested in *their* understanding of the term. This has been a premise for discussions, and as such I have secured construct validity.

2.3.4 Reliability

Construct validity is also connected to *reliability*. Thor Arnfinn Kleven (2002:154) describes reliability as the degree of haphazard errors of measurement; how exact the measurements are, and if they measure what they are said to measure. One way to secure reliability of the data is to be aware of the *aspect of equivalence* (Kleven 2002:159, my translation). This concerns to what degree the measurements are influenced by the concrete questions asked, or if other equivalent questions would result in the same answers. I always tried to ask follow-up questions when things were unclear, and, when time allowed me, I tried to express how I understood my informants' answers in order to get misunderstandings out of the way. An important factor for the reliability of my interviews is my choice of using a recorder under the sessions. This made it possible to get more accurate information from my respondents, and also, I was able to get an accurate transcription of their answers. This was also an advantage in the process of analysis, as I could get other people to read the transcriptions when I had doubts about the interpretations.

This concerns another aspect of reliability; the *aspect of the observer* (Kleven 2002:168, translated by me), and to what degree what is understood depends on her/his interpretations. The use of a recorder also minimized the language problems, as I was able to listen through my interviews at a later point, to get a more detailed understanding of them. It freed time to pay more attention to the respondents during the interviews, putting my follow-up questions and making the conversation as smooth as possible. But the use of a recorder might also have had negative impacts. Some of my respondents might have felt uncomfortable in a setting with the recorder present, and they might have been reluctant to speak honestly about certain matters.

There is also a reason to believe that I as a person might have influenced my informants and their answers. This concerns the *aspect of stability* (Kleven 2002:159, my translation); to what extent the informants' answers are congruent over time. For

instance, many of my informants mentioned agents from the North on the development aid agenda, which might have been influenced by the fact that I come from the North. It is probable that reliability has been threatened in this particular case, and one must be aware of this danger.

2.4 Ethical implications

2.4.1 Responsibility for my case and informants

When conducting research, there are many ethical considerations to keep in mind. In the “Ethical directions for research on social sciences, law and human sciences”² one of the ethical norms concerns the search for truth and accountability (Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 2003³). In addition to conducting critical revision of one’s findings, one also needs to be conscious about the danger of biased research. It is obvious that this has ethical implications. Consideration to the phenomenon of interests and the persons involved, demands a reasonable and fair presentation of the research findings.

Throughout the research process, I always tried to act professionally and reliable. In the meeting with my respondents it was important for me to assure them that I am aware of the seriousness of my work, and that I am strongly concerned about its ethical implications. The ethical directions emphasize the importance of getting the informants’ agreement to participate (Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 2003⁴). I therefore always started my interviews by telling my respondents what their information would be used for and what I wanted to talk about. I emphasized that the participation was voluntary, and that they could end the interview whenever they wanted to. After this information, I understood my informants’ willingness to meet me as their “informed agreement” to participate (Ryen 2002:208). I told them I had a recorder, but they were free to choose whether I could

² My translation, from Norwegian: “Forskningsetiske retningslinjer for samfunnsvitenskap, jus og humaniora”.

³ Document from the web, page number 6 on print-out.

⁴ Document from the web, page number 8 on print-out.

use it or not. I also emphasized that they could ask me to stop recording at any time during the interview, and that they could also ask me questions in connection to my project.

Another important ethical implication, also mentioned by the ethical directions, is the issue of *anonymity*. The respondents should be secured that what they say will be kept confidential, and that its use will not do them any harm (Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 2003⁵). I strongly emphasized that my respondents' names, as well as their institutions or organizations, would be kept anonymous as far as possible. The informants from civil society, some from the donor community and also some from different governmental institutions are in that way kept anonymous to a great extent. I have tried to keep my informants anonymous also by keeping them neutral of gender, since the environment that I have selected them from is quite small and transparent. Informants from the bigger institutions and organizations, such as Unesco, the World Bank and the ministry, nevertheless agreed to let me make their institutions explicit, and I find this of interest for the analysis. I am of the opinion that this has had no influence on the results of my analysis. The educationist Birgit Brock-Utne (1996) discusses the problem of anonymity in connection to the need for external validity. Because as one aspires for external validity, and keeps the contextual surroundings explicit, anonymity will be harder to maintain. It is always a task for the researcher to balance these two considerations. Since many times there were only one or two persons available at each institution, working on my area of interest, I cannot be sure that no one can be recognized in my thesis. The focus on anonymity has, however, been a heavy priority in this project.

I also, as the ethical directions prescribe (Den nasjonale forskningsetiske komité for samfunnsvitenskap og humaniora 2003⁶), emphasize that my work should bring something back to Mozambique. I therefore decided to write this thesis in English, to make it available for my respondents and others in Mozambique. I intend to do my best to make sure that all my respondents will have the possibility to read the final

⁵ Document from the web, page number 11 on print-out.

⁶ Document from the web, page number 9 on print-out.

thesis, if they wish so. Not only because they then will be able to criticize my work, since they have been involved in it, but it is also my hope that this thesis can be of practical use.

2.4.2 Cross-cultural research

Connected to the ethical implications of qualitative methodology, the investigator's role in the field is always important to have in mind. In my research project, conducted in another country with a different culture, this becomes especially important. We are doing research on the social world, and the researcher will necessarily be an *insider* or an *outsider* in the environment of interest. Brock-Utne (1996:607) emphasizes that it is important that research on Africa is also done by Africans, and not only by expatriates. The insider has a special position that will give her/him knowledge that the outsider will not get, and (s)he also has knowledge that makes her/him able to put the right questions. On the other hand, there is a question of the ability to stay objective enough, when one is strongly connected to the field. An outsider perspective might throw light on other sides of a matter, not obvious to the insider (Brock-Utne 1996:610).

During my fieldwork I had only limited contact with my respondents, as the interviews normally lasted about one hour. I was certainly an outsider in the field of my area of investigation, although I tried to be conscious about the African perspective on the matter. In this regard, I have tried to make extensive use of literature and theory with an insider-perspective, written by Africans. Nevertheless, I am a white, young woman and my informants are mostly black men, often middle-aged. I needed to be concerned that some of them might feel uncomfortable with the situation. The history of colonization and aid dependency could have played a role in this situation, as Mozambicans are used to relate to white, foreign "experts", which might have given them a more or less sceptical attitude to new, white academics arriving. I did not feel this as a problem, though, as most of the people I talked to, clearly had a higher status than me. In that way some of the cultural barriers were neutralized by the fact that my respondents and I often shared a common academic background. The gender issue could become more problematic. Brock-Utne (1993:65) describes her experiences of being a white woman in a black academic environment, dominated by men. She claims that there is a contrast between the behaviour demanded in an academic environment and the behaviour expected of women in many African cultures. These women have to

perform more carefully than their sisters in the North. Hence, some of my respondents may have felt uncomfortable in relating professionally to a woman. Also the fact that I am quite young could be a disadvantage, as elderly people are more respected in Africa (Sono 1993:41). I tried to minimize these cultural barriers by behaving respectfully, dressing formally and by always being polite and patient.

2.5 Summary and concluding evaluation of validity

Upon finalizing this thesis, I have of course got experiences and knowledge of things I would have done differently if I had had more time or other resources for this project. It would for instance be interesting to undertake new interviews to be able to go more at depth with the final focus of my thesis, or to validate the interviews already conducted. I am however of the opinion that I have been as explicit and structured as possible throughout the whole work with this thesis, and that this contributes to a valid research result. The interview guide and my early contact with some respondents was a good preparation for my fieldwork. I have been aware of the difficulties of the interview situation, especially in a cross-cultural study like mine, and I have taken ethical considerations into account. Throughout the process of translation, transcription and analysis of data, I have been conscious in my decisions.

Overall, I have attempted to secure external validity as I have been careful to outline the context of my thesis, so that analytical generalizations might be made. Internal validity has carefully been considered through my own critical attitude to conclusions drawn, and so has construct validity. Reliability is secured by investigation of the aspect of equivalence, the aspect of the observer, and the use of a recorder has helped me in doing this. I am of the opinion that the validity of this research project is secured within the limits of what one might demand of a master thesis. I have attempted to structure this thesis to make it available for critical evaluation of research methods and conclusions.

3. THE MOZAMBIKAN BACKGROUND

The Mozambican history is one of oppression and exploitation of the Mozambicans, making it a country with generations lacking democratic experience, at least in a Western sense. First, the colonial masters made the Mozambicans inferior and left them with no democratic experience as they were becoming independent (3.1). Then the liberation heroes from *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) continued this development, as they gained power and introduced a socialist, one-party regime that gradually detached from the Mozambican people (3.2 and 3.3). External forces have also contributed to this lack of democratic experience. They took part in a civil war which lasted for about 15 years (3.4), making Mozambique even more dependent on external aid (3.5). The latest events with multi-party elections and other changes into a Western-type democracy have had positive outcomes for the Mozambican democracy, but there are also drawbacks, making it clear that it is still a way to go before the democracy in Mozambique can be said to be consolidated (3.6). Through this outline, the lack of democratic experience becomes apparent, and in the summary I argue that this illustrates the need for education for citizenship (3.7).

3.1 Portuguese Colony

When the Portuguese arrived in Mozambique in 1498, this had at first little influence on the Bantu people living in the area (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:15). The spice trade from the Far East was lucrative, and in searching for a sea route around Africa, Mozambique became a station on the way (Newitt 1995). But with the industrial revolution in the middle of the eighteenth century came the need for slaves, making it the dominant commodity (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:15; Newitt 1995:245). The historian Malyn Newitt (1995:383) claims that it soon appeared that the most exploitable resource of the colony was the African population. A law of 1899 divided the Mozambicans into two classes; the *indígenas* (natives) and the *não-indígenas*. The *não-indígenas* had full Portuguese citizenship rights, while the *indígenas* were to follow the laws of the colony. This had the greatest impact when it came to labour and taxes. Chiefs or *régulos* were appointed by the colony masters to administer the *indígenas* and collect their taxes and recruit labour. Forced labour and taxes became an

important income for the Portuguese mother-country, and part of the regime that the *indígenas* had to get accustomed to (Newitt 1995).

Mozambique was influenced by the developments in the colony's mother country, and in 1926 there was a military coup in Portugal. The generals gaining power became increasingly dependent on Professor António Salazar, who became the finance minister and later the prime minister with total control of the government. Salazar ruled Portugal according to contemporary fascism, and the enemies of the regime, European and African, emphasized that during the period with Salazar in power, all freedom was suppressed, and the African people was reduced to forced labour (Newitt 1995).

The Portuguese revolution in 1974 put an end to the Salazar regime, and even though this period can be characterized as a "nightmare" for the Mozambicans (Newitt 1995:446), it had some positive consequences for the country. At independence in 1975, Mozambique was better off than many other African states. It had good export possibilities and it had developed industries of different kinds (Newitt 1995). It is nevertheless no doubt that the colonial era had negative effects, and Newitt (1995:389-390) claims that one of these, is the lack of political and administrative experience.

The colonial regime also had an impact when it came to education. The educationist Derek Heater (2004) claims that education for citizenship was ignored, partly because it was not to the advantage of the colonists, as their superiority was built on the ignorance of the natives. Overall, the development of citizenship is incompatible with colonialism (Heater 2004:125). The colonialist philosophy of superiority stands in huge contrast to the equal participation of citizens, needed in a democracy. But the colonists did eventually experience a dilemma concerning education. They needed educated natives as clerks, but at the same time they feared that this education would develop in them a desire for independence. The education provided was to create a native elite of replicas of the citizens of the colonies' mother-countries. In Mozambique these were to become *assimilados* (Heater 2004:128), assimilated into the Portuguese culture. Little was done to promote education for the masses in Mozambique, as this was seen as a threat to Portuguese interests. Not until independence, education and education for citizenship was acknowledged by the indigenous leaders, as a vital tool for the building of their new-born nations (Heater 2004:144).

3.1.1 Lack of democratic experience

Newitt argues that even though in the 1920s the colonies were to achieve more autonomy, this did not happen in practice. Mozambique was still ruled by a colonial administrative elite, and local opinion was not heard. This had consequences for Mozambique later on:

The failure to develop any organs of settler or indigenous democracy was to have great significance. It meant that the settlers were never able to stage an independent take-over of Mozambique like the white Rhodesian seizure of power in 1965. It also meant that the Afro-Portuguese, who had been so influential in the earlier phases of Mozambique's history, were altogether excluded from power and no local groupings with political or administrative experience would emerge among any sector of the Mozambique population. This lack of political or even administrative experience was to have serious consequences when Mozambique eventually became independent. (Newitt 1995:389-390).

Freire describes the same situation in Brazil. I find his thoughts interesting also applied on the Mozambican context, as there are great similarities between the two countries. Freire labels a society without democratic experience a closed society, and argues that democratic inexperience is the major obstacle to democratization (Freire 1974:21).

3.2 Liberation struggle and socialism

Portugal experienced little challenge to its African colonial empire before the 1960s. The Portuguese opposition was weak and divided, and not much interested in the colonial issue (Newitt 1995: 517). The state security police kept people that were hostile to the regime at a close watch. Mozambican nationalism was thus born abroad. Expatriates in the neighbouring countries joined in different organizations, responding to the first wave of decolonisation. Three of these organizations came together and founded Frelimo in June 1962 (Newitt 1995).

The independence struggle had been fought by peaceful means, but in 1964 an armed liberation struggle began (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). The revolution in Portugal in 1974 created confusion in Mozambique, as to who was in charge, and hence, Frelimo could continue its warfare, meeting no resistance (Newitt 1995). Since other fractions in Mozambique, not supporting Frelimo, were not strong enough to organize themselves politically, there was no alternative to Frelimo rule as the new government took office in Portugal (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:27). On 7 September 1974, the

Lusaka Accord was signed, transferring power to the liberation heroes of Frelimo, without prior elections (Newitt 1995). But the economy the first five years after independence was at a downturn. The settlers left the country and brought all their materials, money and resources in addition to their own skills. At the same time, Mozambican miners were left out from the industry in South Africa, contributing to less cash flow from their earnings. Additionally, floods and droughts in this period brought much of the population close to starvation (Newitt 1995:551). The one-party regime of Frelimo had heavy challenges ahead.

3.3 One-party regime

Newitt (1995:541) claims that Frelimo was an intellectuals' party from the beginning. It was emphasized that the country's history, social structure and economic development needed to be studied, to ensure the best possible policies. Frelimo performed a class struggle, and mass mobilization of the peasantry was important (Newitt 1995). But Newitt (1995:543) argues that there was a change in the nature of the party after independence. Mass mobilization was still important, but now rather through organizations outside the party structure (Newitt 1995). The journalist and writer Joseph Hanlon claims that Frelimo became a "vanguard" party; power was gathered within the party and the state apparatus (Hanlon 1991:13). There was a change in politics, possibly caused by the difficulties the new leaders had to handle:

Whereas previously the party had often been prepared for lengthy popular debates on important issues before decisions were reached, after 1975 these popular democratic procedures tended to be circumvented. Party members gradually changed their role from dynamising, motivating and creating political consciousness in a newly liberated people, to issuing orders and carrying centrally decided party diktats to the provinces (Newitt1995:543).

At the same time, the escape of the Portuguese settlers and the break-down of the Mozambican administration meant these posts had to be filled by party members. Increasingly, a division between the party and the people arose. The intellectual origin of the party became evident, as its politics was rather based in theory, and not in people's reality. This was, however, a dilemma of great concern to the leadership, who were aware of the problems with a one-party democracy that is not in contact with its people. To prevent this, they arranged elections for a pyramid of popular assemblies on national, provincial, district, city and local levels (Newitt 1995). They also exerted

“self-criticism”, by publicly admitting mistakes. This can be said to have been a clever political tool, as Frelimo in that way was able to draw attention away from other cases that would have been more of a challenge to them (Newitt 1995:544). There was a gradual shift to the left in Frelimo’s policy, and this development culminated on the third party congress in 1977, where it declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist Party (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995; Newitt 1995).

There can be many reasons to why authoritarian regimes are implemented. Diamond (1993) claims that the nature of the African fight for liberation and de-colonization was influenced by the lack of democratic experience. The main objective was to get rid of the colonial power and everything that belonged to it. The existing structures and systems were not to be inherited, but rather rejected as alien: “Democratic norms were thus expressed primarily in terms of protest, opposition, and “counter-hegemony”, rather than in terms of tolerance, liberty and democratic procedures” (Diamond 1993:17). Another problem was that the period of transition from colonial regimes to independence and democratic elections was very short. People’s minds and public institutions were not prepared for the transition, and not able to carry it out in a satisfactory manner:

Democratic institutions in the newly-dependent states faced serious obstacles: ethnic divisions and a shallow sense of nationhood, fragile political institutions and political leadership only weakly committed to democracy, limited managerial and technical talent, high popular expectations in severely restricted economic circumstances and a tendency, in the absence of a vigorous private sector, for political leaders to see the state as the prime source of personal enrichment (Harber 1997:14-15).

To be able to control the situation, authoritarian regimes were frequently implemented. There was a belief that a single party could represent everybody without support along ethnic divides, as a multi-party system would encourage. Its justification was based in the tradition of a single, uncontested chief (Harber 1997:15).

The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, speaks in favour of the one-party democracy and its election system (Nyerere 1973). He argues that this electoral system “must allow the people to elect a competent government which reflects their feelings and ideas; and it must enable them to do this without damaging the society in which they live, or the long-term objectives they have set themselves” (Nyerere 1973:186). The democracy is taken care of by the fact that the people can choose between

different candidates, and he argues that the elections make the Party stay in touch with the people. But as I have argued, this did not last for long in Mozambique. At the same time, Nyerere emphasizes that the one-party elections make sure that the people do not damage the objectives they have set themselves, reflecting the communal, African tradition. But this might also be interpreted as undemocratic at its greatest sense. To me, it seems like if the range of choices for the people will be reduced, and one might ask oneself; who did actually set these long-term objectives? It appears that the organization of the Mozambican society by a one-party regime could not longer make use of its democratic potential, and this might have contributed to a continuation of the lack of democratic experience.

3.4 Destabilization and “civil war”

Alongside all the challenges for the new regime were also the regional conflicts in the area. South Africa had for a long time led a policy for co-existence in the region, which served as a security for Mozambique. But after the independence of the earlier white regimes in Southern Africa, a change in South African policy took place. The earlier focus on co-existence was followed by a set determination for survival of South Africa (Newitt 1995:559-560). In South Africa the apartheid regime ruled, led by a white minority. A black majority rule was seen as dangerous, resulting in a communist state. For this reason, it was important for the South African rulers to prevent the black Marxist-Leninist Mozambique and Angola from spreading their ideology and contribute to riots in South Africa. The South African apartheid regime was criticized internationally for its racist rule, but marked by the environment of the Cold War the American President Reagan was of the opinion that preventing the spreading of socialist economy and policy, was of major importance (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). Hence, the foreign policy of South Africa has been described as a *policy of destabilization*. Attacks on countries in the region were said to be strikes at African National Congress (ANC) – bases, but were rather attacks to demonstrate South Africa’s strength (Newitt 1995:561-562).

Also part of this policy of destabilization was the support of, and in the case of Mozambique creation of, rebel movements in the neighbouring countries (Newitt 1995). *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) was created abroad by dissidents from Frelimo, not as a political movement, but rather as a military unit, with

the rural population as its principal targets (Newitt 1995:564). By 1984 Renamo had offices in Lisbon, West Germany and in the United States. That year its political statements were pledged at a congress, and Renamo turned into a political movement. This was important for Reagan and South Africa, who wanted Renamo to be internationally accepted (Newitt 1995:565). Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995:58) points to the regional and international aspect of the war. It was a regional conflict between apartheid-friendly states and their opposites, and also an international conflict between communism and capitalism. One might question whether the term “civil war” is suitable in this context.

Up to 1986, Renamo was pretty much controlled by foreign masters, but now this control was lost, and Renamo developed on its own, within Mozambique. Even though a security agreement was signed at Nkomati in 1984, the fighting and terror intensified: “Generally accepted figures show that by 1990 100.000 people had lost their lives as a result of the fighting and up to 4 million (one third of the entire population) had been made refugees or been displaced” (Newitt 1995:571). When situated inside Mozambique, Renamo changed its tactics. While maintaining the terrorization of the population, they also took advantage of and contributed to the hostility between Frelimo and traditional authorities. A growing opposition to Frelimo, mainly within the peasantry, made them an easy pray for exploitation by Renamo forces (Newitt 1995).

With the changes in South Africa in 1990, there was an increasing pressure on Frelimo, also by its external aid donors, to end the conflict. Frelimo entered in talks with Renamo, and in November constitutional changes were made to allow multi-party elections and end the one-party rule. From having been enemies in a civil war, Frelimo and Renamo were now becoming the two largest political parties in Mozambique. The final ceasefire was signed 15 October 1992. By this time the Frelimo government was extremely weakened by the challenges it had gone through, and now its weakness became apparent: The collapse of the economy left officials unpaid and lead to corruption, the army was demoralized, the public services and the industry were in strikes and in 1992 another severe drought added to the suffering of the Mozambican people (Newitt 1995). This made Mozambique even more dependent on external aid.

3.5 Aid dependency

Already in the mid-1970s, Mozambique took its first steps in the direction of aid dependency. Access to international credit was great, and real rates of interest low. It was an opportunity for the countries in the Third World to start a development process using cheap international financial means. But after the second oil crisis in 1980/81, the rates of interests increased, and made the debt burden unbearable. Within two years Mozambique was forced to take out new loans to cover debt repayments (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995).

During the early 80s, Mozambique needed emergency aid due to famine, but it proved difficult to get enough support from Western donors (Hanlon 1991:28-29). This was much due to the Western scepticism towards the Marxist government, and Frelimo was forced to turn to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc for assistance. Because of the Cold War and its own material problems, the Soviet Union was no longer that ambitious with their commitments in the Third World in the 1980s (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:98; Newitt 1995:560). Frelimo searched for a way out, not depending on either the East or the West. They signed the peace agreement and joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1984. But they did not yet abandon socialism, and they were not willing to adapt all conditionalities set by the donors (Hanlon 1991:120-121). For the West, aid to Marxist states in Africa became a way of preventing communism from spreading (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995:133). As Mozambique did not get what they needed from the East block countries, they were slowly forced to turn to the West. Hence, Western aid started to pour in, but only slowly, as the West tried to pressure for policy changes. The policy of destabilization increased in 1986, and Frelimo was forced to choose the “Western way”. In 1987, Frelimo agreed to the demands set by the IMF (Hanlon 1991:28ff). In this environment, Mozambique’s socialist ideology was hard to maintain, and at the fifth party congress in 1989 Frelimo abandoned their role as a socialist party, adjusting to the demands of the development partners (Hanlon 1991:48).

I will go more extensively into the implications of aid dependency as I discuss the development aid partnership in chapter 4.

3.6 Towards democracy

With the introduction of a multi-party regime in 1990, the liberal press law from 1991, the ceasefire from 1992 and the parliamentary and presidential elections in October 1994, big steps towards democratization in Mozambique were taken (Weimer 2000). The development aid agencies seem to regard Mozambique's development as one of the few Sub-Saharan successes of the 1990s (Braathen and Orre 2001:199). But the political scientists Einar Braathen and Aslak Orre question this success-story, and claim that elections are not enough for democracy to have been implemented; there is also a need for the institutionalization of a democratic culture (Braathen and Orre 2001).

Braathen (2003) argues that the process of democratization in Mozambique is in many ways on a downturn. On the first elections in 1994, won by Frelimo, there was a voter turnout of 85% (Braathen 2003:4). A law was sustained for decentralization of power and the introduction of municipal elections. But after these first elections Frelimo became more reluctant to power sharing, Braathen claims. The laws to implement decentralization were changed, and the implementation postponed and carried out to a lesser extent (Braathen 2003:4). Braathen argues that this signifies a process of *repatrimonialisation*, a tendency of centralization and concentration of power: "The co-opting party regards the other parties as an obstacle to its hegemony, and to some extent turns society and the state into its own property" (Mazula cited in Braathen 2003:3). Repatrimonialisation is an obstacle for the further democratization of Mozambique, and for instance it delayed the first municipal elections, that were not held until 1998. The opposition boycotted these elections because of the change in attitude from Frelimo, resulting in a voter turnout of only 14,48% (Braathen 2003:7). Braathen (2003) holds that this low participation is due to the boycott and also the use of a language of force which characterized the campaigns, reminding the Mozambicans too much of the past: "The two main parties both took substantial issues out of politics, and preferred making general propaganda" (Braathen and Orre 2001:225). Braathen claims that all in all the political system in Mozambique is threatened by *destabilization*; criminalization of the state; delegitimization of the political, administrative and legal systems; and militarization of politics (Braathen 2003:15-16).

Weimer agrees in this, as he argues that the results of a country's second elections are descriptive for its democratic state. The 1999 presidential elections show that Mozambique has still a long way to go before democracy is consolidated, he claims (Weimer 2000:6). The 1999 elections were again won by Frelimo, there was a voter turnout of 75% and there was no boycott in advance (Braathen and Orre 2001:201). But Weimer points to the fact that the results of the elections were not accepted by the opposition. International observers could neither guarantee that fraud had not taken place. Thus, Renamo chose to boycott following political debates and votes (Weimer 2000). The result is a political crisis where the opposition, although it is the dominating party in some provinces, is not acknowledged, and where the common belief in national institutions that are important to a democracy, is harmed (Weimer 2000). There is also a total lack of consensus of the political rules of game between Frelimo and Renamo; there are no rational discussions between the ruling-party and the opposition (Weimer 2000:10-11). Braathen holds that the destabilization noticeable from 1998 has persisted with increased strength, as the campaign carried out by the opposition to reject the legitimacy of the 1999 elections was violently struck down by the government (Braathen 2003).

An illustration of the situation of repatremonialisation and destabilisation of the Mozambican society is the high level of corruption. This is one of the main obstacles for democratization in many African countries today.

3.6.1 Corruption

The economist Alan Doig (2000) argues that corruption is a constraint to democracy, because the common values of a country are not used for the common good, but rather to enrich individuals. At the same time, democratization is put forward by the international community as a means to solve the problem of corruption and further development, he claims. Doig argues that the problem is not solved through democratization; he rather questions whether new types of corruption might appear in this process. Nevertheless, Doig (2000:14) upholds democracy and its qualities, and emphasizes its characteristics of criticism, opposition and participation.

The many regional and international conventions against corruption over the last years illustrate how common the problem of corruption is⁷. These agreements are important steps on the way to fight corruption, but much still depends on how they are followed-up and monitored.

The economist David Stasavage argues that corruption is a serious problem in Mozambique and that it has been increasing in a ten-year period until 1996 (Stasavage 2000:65). Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)⁸ shows that Mozambique has gone from 3,5 in 1999 to 2,7 in 2003, which means the corruption is wide-spread, and has become worse (Transparency International 1999; Transparency International 2003). One of the most well-known cases of corruption in Mozambique is the bank fraud connected to the privatization of Banco Commercial de Moçambique in 1996, which believably led to the assassination of the journalist Carlos Cardoso, who disclosed the affair. As a result, two businessmen, the Maputo branch manager of the bank and five local contract killers were arrested and 39 police officers were dismissed (Transparency International 2001:55). Stasavage (2000:95) claims that the problem of corruption is not addressed in a serious manner in Mozambique, and that there are no planned reforms to solve the problem. During my stay in Maputo, there was another case of corruption that got immense media-attention. A Swedish audit report concluded that the financial management system within the education sector was not satisfyingly run. Funds provided from the donors to increase the capacity of the ministry's personnel had been used for other non-intended means, and there were different speculations and versions of how they had been used (Savana Semanário Independente 9.4.2004; Savana Semanário Independente 23.4.2004). Even though these events are made known in the press, one might question if a society, in which this can occur, is stabilized according to democratic ideals.

⁷ In December 2003 the UN Convention against Corruption was signed by 95 countries (United Nations 2004). The African Union, amongst others, has followed this up, with the "Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offences" (Transparency International 2004:117).

⁸ Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) gives an overview of the level of corruption in different countries in the world, as it is seen by business people, academics and risk analysts. The CPI operates with an index from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) (Transparency International 1999; Transparency International 2003).

Nevertheless, Braathen and Orre (2001) argue that they believe that the tendency of destabilization will not last. Braathen rejects the patrimonial democracy, argued by some to be the new paradigm for Africa, as an alternative for Mozambique:

[T]he political elites on the domestic scene cannot expect to play the game of repatrimonialisation and destabilization indefinitely without being punished by (i) a war-weary electorate, (ii) a maturing civil society, and (iii) new popular movements demanding real democracy and social economic justice (Braathen 2003:20).

Such patrimonialism would be modernization without development; importation of democracy and other political features, implemented in an instrumentalist manner, he claims. Braathen does not think that this will be viable in Mozambique, as the forces of democratization and repatrimonialisation clearly exist in deep conflict in the Mozambican society today (Braathen 2003).

The recent period is consequently one of important events to Mozambique, and in this setting, education for citizenship might play an important role. This emphasis is evident in Mozambique, as they are now implementing education for citizenship as a new subject in school: *Educação Moral e Cívica*⁹. I see the implementation of this subject as instrumental for the democratization of Mozambique. I also view it as an indication of the commitment to democratization from the Mozambican government, and a sign of the need for state-building and creation of national identity.

3.7 Summary; a history lacking democratic experience

The historical outline has shown that the Mozambicans lack democratic experience, and that their history of colonization and an authoritarian regime has contributed to this situation. This lack is also clearly evident in the present situation in Mozambique, as there are still huge obstacles for a genuine democratization of Mozambique. Corruption is an increasing problem, and the politicians are in many ways contributing to a repatrimonialisation and destabilization of the political system in Mozambique. I

⁹This is the new Mozambican subject of moral and civic education, a subject that should be integrated in the other subjects from 1st to 5th grade, while in 6th and 7th grade it is taught as a subject of its own. It covers themes ranging from the family and local community to Mozambique's relation to the international and global community. Within the limits of this master thesis I am not able to go further into the concrete content of the subject, even though this would be interesting (See: Inde/Unesco 2001a; Inde/Unesco 2001 b; Inde/Unesco 2001 c; Inde/Unesco 2001 d). I rather focus on this subject's role in general, as Mozambican education's most important tool in the process of democratization.

am of the opinion that education for citizenship is helpful in this situation. The lack of democratic experience needs to be diminished. The Mozambican people have to participate in, and experience, democracy. In this respect, education for citizenship can be instrumental. I have shown to the introduction of education for citizenship as a school subject in Mozambique as one positive development in the present situation. In the following chapter, I continue to outline the Mozambican context and the backdrop of the process of democratization, by providing an overview of the development aid relationship in general, and in Mozambique in particular.

4. DEVELOPMENT AID AND ITS CRITICS

The aid agencies and the donor community have a saying in policy planning, and are powerful participants on the political agenda in Mozambique. Nevertheless, development aid is an issue of great controversies and dilemmas. In this chapter I outline some of the recent development aid strategies and its critics, and I mainly focus on the development aid within the education sector. Democratization is emphasized by the development aid agents, as a means of development (4.1). But the same agents also make use of undemocratic methods in their work, as conditionalities connected to aid have been common (4.2). The new SWAp and the rhetoric of partnership and local ownership are warmly welcomed in this context, and seem to entail positive features to improve the aid relationship. But at present, the development aid partnership appears not to function according to its intentions (4.3). In this setting, it is of outmost importance that the Mozambican people are also able to take part and influence the processes. One important step in that direction is to have a well-functioning development aid partnership, which the Mozambicans are able to control. I argue that this is another reason for the need for education for citizenship (4.4).

4.1 Development through democratization

Until the end of the cold war, democracy and democratization was of little concern on the African policy agenda, and it was even viewed as opposed to development, being too time-consuming and inefficient. The need for rapid development demanded quick solutions, and democratic disputations were not seen as desirable by the African leaders (Daddieh 1998: 45-46). But the political scientist Cyril Daddieh (1998) claims that since the late 1980s there has been a change in the view on democracy, and democratic transitions are taking place all over Africa. The social scientist Claude Ake argues that the focus on good governance and democratization is now obvious on the aid agenda. There is a whole movement of different stakeholders, fighting for democracy in Africa today. International NGOs, international financial institutions, Western governments, local grass root organizations, African elite and ordinary people; all have their own special interests and views on what the result and the process of democratization in Africa should be (Ake 1993:239). The World Bank (2004b:271) emphasizes that good governance is connected to poverty. With weak governance the people that need public services the most, will not get them, and the

poor are most likely to suffer. Hence, the World Bank attempts to “develop a subsequent operational strategy for good governance in support of poverty reduction” (World Bank 2004b:271). I find the following quote representative for what I view as typical Western democratic arrangements, and this seems to be what is encouraged by the World Bank:

[The existence of accountability and transparency] is closely linked to the architecture of the state, which defines the relationships among the executive, legislature, and judiciary, and the extent to which they are able to scrutinize each other's behavior. Accountability and transparency also depend on other institutional arrangements for the transfer of power between governments, including voting arrangements and electoral laws. (The World Bank 2004b: 276).

There is no doubt that external partners have an important role to play in encouraging and securing a democratic development. This is, however, not an unproblematic matter, as I will discuss throughout this chapter. In chapter 5 I will go more at length with the problems of a pure transfer of a Western democracy to Africa.

The World Bank is also very much involved in the construction of educational policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Brock-Utne claims that this has contributed to a surprising congruence amongst the educational policies of the different agencies (Brock-Utne 2000:70ff). There has of course been controversy connected to aid policies within the *donor community*¹⁰, but even so, some main tendencies remain. It is therefore helpful to take a closer look at some of the World Bank policies, in order to understand the historical development of the aid relationship.

4.2 Aid conditionality and the World Bank policy

When it comes to aid and conditionality, Roger C. Riddell, researcher on development issues, states that aid is not only given for development purposes. Aid is also given to obtain other non- development objectives; to have political influence on the recipient countries or to help increasing domestic export (Riddell 1997:459). The educationist Göran Linde (2000) argues that during the 60s and 70s, the posing of conditionality or imposition was considered taboo, but in the 1980s, aid was given on stricter terms and

¹⁰ By *donor community* (or developing agents) I here mean all agencies that cooperate and take part in the development of different countries. I will later talk about the donor community in Mozambique.

to a greater extent on the givers' conditions. Linde (2000:204) argues that a situation of influence is natural and inevitable, and he maintains that development on the recipients' terms was not an appropriate solution for development, due to the high levels of corruption in many recipient countries. He argues that in cultures where people have strong connections to family and tribe, the discrepancy between personal and national interests can be difficult to maintain. He is however aware that the increased cooperation and focus on the quality of education might contribute to increased donor-power, and therefore a need for further focus on the aid relationship and conditionality Linde (2000). Brock-Utne (2000) focuses on the natural asymmetry in the aid relationship, where one party donates the money, and the other receives them. This uneven power relationship will unavoidably contribute to difficulties in balancing the aid relationship. Brock-Utne goes as far as to claim that the donors have probably caused more harm than good for the education sector in Africa, and that "over the last fifteen years under the donor pressures of structural adjustment an intellectual recolonization of Africa has taken place" (Brock-Utne 2000:289).

The *(Economic) Structural Adjustment Programs* ((E)SAPs) were introduced by the World Bank in the mid-1980s to enhance economic development in Africa. These programs reflected a belief in the free market and limitation of power for the state, and they have been widely criticized (Heynemann 2003:326). The educationists and africanists Kenneth King and Simon McGrath claim that the emphasis on economic growth did not lead to decreased inequality (King and McGrath 2002:42). The downsizing of the state is now being reconsidered, as the importance of the state as a catalyst for development again is on the agenda (King and McGrath 2002). Within the education sector the (E)SAPs had great influence. Privatization, decentralization, user fees, and focus on basic education as general prescriptions, was not what the developing countries needed. School enrolments were declining in countries with (E)SAPs (Alexander 2002:21¹¹).

Hanlon argues that this policy had negative effects on Mozambique as well: "Structural adjustment accelerated privatization and social differentiation. Poverty and hunger became more widespread, while conspicuous wealth and consumption

¹¹ Article found on the web, page number from print-out.

increased. Health and education, the two pillars of Frelimo's popularity, were hit hard by destabilization and structural adjustment" (Hanlon 1991:279). Hanlon refers to reviews done by the World Bank and the IMF, where they themselves agree that the budget for social welfare was squeezed to a "dysfunctional" level (Hanlon 1991:137). The educationist David Plank argues that the Mozambican government at the time was viewed as "easy to work with" (Plank 1993:32, my translation). The recommendations put forward by the IMF and the World Bank was seldom rejected, the government knowing that this was the easiest way to ensure continuation of aid funds (Plank 1993).

There has nevertheless been a shift in the newer aid rhetoric, which now focuses immensely on terms like partnership and local ownership, as we shall see in the following.

4.3 SWApS, PRSPs and ESSPs: A new era of partnership or ongoing conditionality?

Former adviser in DANIDA, Ole Mølgård Andersen (2000), claims that during the 1980s the aid community turned much of their aid resources into program support instead of direct project support. This resulted in a decrease in their strong, direct control with the funds. It soon turned out that the money were not always used as they were supposed to, and therefore, during the 1990s *Sector Wide Approaches* (SWApS) became the new development aid strategy, identified within different donor agencies. The new approach gave recipient countries and the donors shared responsibility for the development cooperation (Andersen 2000:179). The SWAp is a more holistic approach to development aid, and in some ways an answer to the criticism of the (E)SAPs. Within a SWAp, one should consider development more integrally, and take all accounts into consideration, not only focusing on limited projects or universal solutions. The educationist Steven J. Klees claims that a genuine SWAp is said to be: "sector-wide; based on a clear and coherent policy framework; local stakeholders are supposed to be fully in charge; all main donors must agree to it; implementation must be developed jointly; and it should depend on local capacity, not technical assistance" (Klees 2001:2). Preferably all aid agencies involved in a sector, the local government and civil society are brought together to create a national policy for the different sectors. The increased cooperation between the different donors and between donors

and government is supposed to contribute to better dialogue and partnership cooperation; the process should be more transparent and efficient. The intention is to give the local governments more ownership of their policy planning (Klees 2001). Basket- and budget funding is part of this picture, where donors provide funds to a common basket, to be used for the whole sector according to government policies. Andersen claims that this is essential for effective donor-coordination, and argues that it is necessary that funds are channelled through the national budgets in order to have a system where the money is accounted for (Andersen 2000:187-188). Another result of the basket funding, one might argue, is that the national governments may become more independent if they get support through the budget, and themselves decide the priorities to be done. But this still depends on the degree of conditionality connected to the funding.

The change to the SWAp happened at a time with much focus on cooperation in the development aid arena. In 1990 in Jomtien, Thailand, the *Education for All* (EFA)-declaration was sustained, stating that education is a universal right for all (Brock-Utne 2000; Unesco 1990). In 2000 at *The World Education Forum* in Dakar, Senegal, it was determined that the EFA-goal should be reached by 2015 (Unesco 2000:15). This focus on education is also seen in the UN Millennium goals, one of them being to reach *Universal Primary Education* by the year 2015 (Unesco 2002). In 2001, the *Fast-Track Initiative* (FTI), a plan to escalate the process of education for all, was sustained. The FTI implies that countries that meet certain criteria, and that work for the EFA goal, shall have the resources necessary to be able to accomplish their strategies and plans. The criteria to become one of the FTI-countries are that the country has a *Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan* (PRSP) and/or an *Education Sector Strategy Plan* (ESSP), in accordance with the donors. Mozambique is one out of 18 countries that met the FTI-criteria (Takala 2003¹²; World Bank 2004¹³). The Mozambican PRSP, *Programa de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza* was produced in 2001 (Republic of Mozambique 2001), and the ESSP, *Plano Estratégico de Educação* (Ministry of Education 1998) was introduced in 1998 and is now under revision. The production of all these plans is done in an environment of cooperation through

¹² Document without pagination, page number 5 on print-out.

¹³ Document without pagination, page number 3 on print-out

partnership between the government and its development aid partners. The question is whether this partnership signifies a new era of aid relationship, or if it is still characterized by conditionality.

4.3.1 Rhetoric and reality

The mentioned documents connected to the strategy change mirror a shift in the development aid rhetoric. Terms like cooperation, partnership and local ownership are frequently used. Klees (2001) argues that the term *partnership* is rapidly becoming well-used by all parts involved in development circles, where almost all activities are based on partnership. Close to all agents are included, and the best example of such a partnership is Education for All (EFA), where nearly every country in the world is a partner. Since everybody is cooperating, no one is to blame, and no one criticizes (Klees 2001:2). Within the donor community, partnership is viewed as positive for local ownership and the inclusion of civil society; it contributes to the development of local capacity building, transparency and openness. But partnership could also be a way of choosing the countries that make the best partners, the ones that are willing to adopt the policies considered rational (King and McGrath 2002:49). Simon Maxwell is also concerned that the maximization of participation and cooperation will blur conflicts between the partners, and create a false impression of the situation (Maxwell 2003:15). Klees (2001) maintains that it is impossible to believe the rhetoric of partnership, and points to research done, showing that real participation in the PRSP process was non-existent, the PRSPs looked little different than the (E)SAPs of the previous decade, with minimum attention to the social sector protection, and with stringent loan conditionalities. Klees argues that the SWAs are wrapped in a holistic, participatory, partnership language; we have “a SAP in SWAs clothing” (Klees 2001:5). He admits that this rhetoric shift is progressive in some respects, the rhetoric shift is important in itself, but all these changes also legitimize the system.

It is also usually agreed that sector-support should strengthen *local ownership*. The FTI framework states that local ownership is one of its guiding principles: “The FTI is a country-driven process, with the primary locus of activity and decision-making at the

country level” (World Bank 2004¹⁴). But in a closed meeting of the African ministers of education in 1993, concern was expressed that the understanding of the term ownership was unclear, and that more information on the issue was needed (Donors to African Education 1994). In this meeting the ministers also reflected on the relationship between donors and recipient countries:

While they appreciate the contribution of donors to the development of education in Africa, the ministers expressed serious concern about the way in which conditionality is imposed on African countries when assistance is provided. They cannot accept conditions being imposed unilaterally and they would like this issue to be fully discussed in a spirit of partnership. The ministers hope that the donors will give full consideration to this issue. (Donors to African Education 1994:27).

Even though progress might have been made, the rhetoric shift is not sufficient to change the practical reality. As with the (E)SAPs from the 1980s, conditionalities are still part of the development aid reality within the present SWAps.

The political scientist Joel Samoff agrees with Klees, as he points to the fact that evolving terminologies do not necessarily imply changed practice (Samoff 2003). Samoff argues that rather than providing a change, the overwhelming *cooperation* and coordination between donors will lead to the opposite. He points to the fact that external governments, international agencies and other international organizations still have great influence on the different countries’ educational policy, by imposing conditionality in the sector-support-process (Samoff 2003:289). Some argues that the PRSPs and the SWAp makes it even worse, since the external agencies can influence not only the areas where they provide loans, but a nations’ entire development strategy (Klees 2001:3; Alexander 2002:40). Even worse so, the shedding of responsibility through this approach is evident. Klees argues that the World Bank recommends actions to be taken, but if these recommendations turn out to give a bad result, this is due to causes outside the control of the World bank and not their responsibility (Klees 2001:6).

¹⁴ Document without pagination, page number 2 on print-out.

4.3.2 Education sector partnership in Mozambique

Mozambique is also following the changing trends of international development aid. The first Education Sector Strategic Plan came about after a process started by the government in 1995. In September 1997 the ministry of Education and its international partners signed a joint aid memoir, where it was confirmed that the making of the strategic framework was a “significant step away from fragmented, project-based cooperation and funding arrangements, towards an integrated programme approach to development in the education sector” (Ministry of Education, Republic of Mozambique and International Development Agencies 1997:2). Within this document, some concerns were raised to be resolved, until the final joint appraisal could be signed by the ministry and its international donor partners in 1998 (Ministry of Education, Republic of Mozambique and International Development Agencies 1997). The joint statement is an agreement that the ESSP is to function as a framework for the Sector Wide Program Support, “an adequate basis on which donors can commit funding” (Ministry of Education and International Donor Partners 1998:2). Mozambique had got its first educational policy as a result of a SWAp, approved by the donors. In this document the partners claim that: “The process has deepened understanding of the sector-wide approach, strengthened the partnership, and fostered greater understanding and commitment between the Government and its donor partners” (Ministry of Education and International Donor Partners 1998:5). The partners included in this SWAp were representatives for the ministry of Education, for the ministry of Planning and Finance, and for the donor community¹⁵ (Ministry of Education and International Donor Partners 1998:1).

But reports from one of the main donor partners show that the process has not been without complications. SIDA’s regional education adviser, Agneta Lind, claims that: “From having been well known as a positive SWAp process, the education sector programme in Mozambique seems to have become rather problematic and a real concern for partners such as Sweden, Ireland and Holland, who so actively have supported the process” (Lind 2002: 4). The 3rd and 4th quarterly reports still express

¹⁵ Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Department for International Development (DFID), European Union (EU), Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), World Food Programme (WFP), World Bank

concern for the process, and Lind (2003:5) claims that the “dependency syndrome” has taken over for the focus on local ownership. It seems as if the partners have not been able to follow through with the intentions of the process, as stated in the early documents.

Tuomas Takala and Mmantsetsa Marope have done a study for the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) Working Group on Education Sector Analysis, and it shows that there exist different understandings between the partners in the education sector about what the SWAp, and especially the term partnership, means (Takala and Marope 2003:7). They claim that “it is not unlikely that the genuine partnership that is characterized by joint decision-making, joint ownership and shared control would be seriously curtailed by imbalances in understanding between the negotiating partners” (Takala and Marope 2003:16). Their Mozambican interviewees felt that they were not in control when decisions within the education sector were to be taken, and they could not set the terms for the partnership. Nevertheless, Takala and Marope claim that if the introduction of the SWAp cannot be characterized as successful, it is at least in the progress of reaching a workable partnership (Takala and Marope 2003:16). Lene Buchert compared the SWAp partnerships in Burkina-Faso, Ghana and Mozambique, and even though she claims that these countries have a long way to go, she got an impression of a Mozambican SWAp that was more inclusive and with a partnership that functioned better than in the other two countries (Buchert 2002:78). She claims, contrary to Takala and Marope, that the national capacity in Mozambique was good, and led to increased local ownership and a more genuine partnership (Buchert 2002:82).

4.4 Summary; democratic partnership for democracy?

Even though Buchert (2002) claims that the partnership in Mozambique functions relatively better than other places, one might question to what degree one can characterize this relationship as democratic. The conditionalities set within the development aid partnership, even after the rhetorical change, imply that the partnership is not functioning according to its intentions -it cannot be said to be a genuine partnership. One can, of course, understand the development agents’ need to secure the use of money provided, as there are undemocratic characteristics of the Mozambican society. But how can developing countries develop in a democratic

manner, when the political processes are not democratic in as such, but rather *forced* upon the African people? There has to be a careful balance between the imposing of conditionalities and the realization of local ownership. It is important that the Mozambicans are able to influence and control the impact that the development agents have on Mozambique. The Mozambicans need to get an understanding of the mechanisms evident in the Mozambican society, the development aid partnership included. In that respect, education for citizenship plays an important role.

If the Mozambican people are not themselves able to control the development of their country, one could go so far as to say that the pressure of the introduction of democracy in Africa is a contradiction in terms. All changes, and perhaps changes for democracy in particular, need to be based on a feeling of ownership amongst the people that are influenced by them. I return to this in the following chapter, as I go on to discuss the term democracy and the problems with the pressure for a transfer of a Western-type democracy to Africa.

5. DEMOCRACY AND ITS TRANSFER

While there still seems to be a way to go before a satisfactory level of democracy is reached in Mozambique, it is important to look into how the democratization is conducted. To be able to do this, I first have to consider the term democracy. The concept of democracy is wide, and democracy theorists have divergent understandings of the term. It can be applied differently to varying contexts and be adjusted to the context it is placed within (5.1). There are implications of the African context that need to be taken into consideration when a democracy is to be created in Mozambique. The “traditional African societies” entail features that one must be aware of to avoid an undemocratic development, but they also imply significant positive contributions when it comes to a more communal and solidarity thinking (5.2). The present socio-political situation entails obstacles for democratization, as well, as the liberal market policy and the liberal democracy promoted by development agents does not take the present African context into account (5.3). This situation implies that we are in need of a new thinking concerning the democratization of developing countries, and so also in Mozambique. The Western liberal democracy cannot be transferred to the African context, as it is not capable of taking care of the specific problems of Africa. A more dynamic definition (5.4) of democracy is needed in the present situation of democratization of the developing countries. I argue that equal participation by all should be encouraged, and therefore, education for citizenship becomes instrumental.

5.1 Types of democracies

The word democracy comes from Greek *Demos* (the people) and *kratein* (to rule), and signifies “rule by the people” (Sono 1993:8). The origin of democracy is the Athens and its *direct democracy*, where all citizens took active part in decision-making through general assemblies or direct elections (Rasch 1998:7). This kind of direct democracy, however, is not common, since the small city-state does no longer exist. The political scientist and economist Themba Sono, claims that due to an increased number of inhabitants and a larger geographical area, a direct rule by the people would be practically difficult (Sono 1993). The political scientist Bjørn Erik Rasch maintains that indirect democracies are a practical solution to the present manifestation of the

democratic ideal, where representatives are chosen to make the decisions (Rasch 1998:7).

One type of indirect democracy is the *competitive* democracy, where representatives compete for votes. The voters act strategically, and according to personal interests. Diverging interest and individual rights are taken care of through elections (Rasch 1998:8-9). With Hobbes as a grounding father, the Western, competitive democracies are often labelled *liberal* democracies. The liberal democracy is characterized by a belief in the value of *individual freedom*; every citizen should be free to follow his or her own intentions, without limiting the freedom of others (Langhelle 1998:66). This implies that *neutrality* is essential; in a society of citizens of different opinions, there is a need for neutrality towards questions concerning the good life. This ideal of neutrality is questioned by the political scientist Bo Lindensjö, who argues that it is an impossible ideal. He also questions the desirability of a value neutral state or policy, as for instance racism or sexism should not be tolerated (Lindensjö 1999:20). The competitive democracy-type has also been criticized for the limited participation by its citizens, restricted to elections once in a while (Rasch 1998:9). The political scientist Carole Pateman (1970:7) also criticizes this. She argues that within the recent theories of democracy, the apathy of the citizens is instrumental for the sustenance of the system. Due to the citizens argued lack of interest in political issues, restriction and limitation of their participation is needed. According to Pateman, these theories view a rule by an enlightened elite - or oligarchy as she labels it - as more effective than the chaos resulting from the maximization of participation by the masses (Pateman 1970:2).

Pateman (1970) forwards the *participatory democracy* as an alternative. This, it can be argued, comes closer to the original ideal of democracy. She argues that representation is not sufficient for democracy. The democratic ideal of maximum participation of all the people demand that individuals and their institutions cannot be seen in isolation. Participation requires socialization and democratic training through participation, and this is done at the best on the local level. Issues on the local level concern the individuals and their everyday life, and this is where the individual can better influence decisions taken. Through the emphasis on participation, this system is self-sustaining. Participation aids the acceptance of collective decisions and furthers socialization into continued participation (Pateman 1970:42-43). This is also important with Freire, as

people need to experience the political and social responsibility, through participation and intervention in their own local societies, to be able to contribute to a democratic development (Freire 1974: 36). The pedagogical character of this view on democracy is evident.

The *deliberative* democracy is put forward by the philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas, and implies that decisions are warranted when they are justified through reasons that are acceptable for all (Eriksen and Weigård 1999:172). The participants should be able to outline their individual and autonomous views for discussion, and in this way their individual freedom is secured. These views are then to be transformed through discourse, through the encounter with other individuals' views, so that they become acceptable for all, and a dimension is added: The common good. This is the process of deliberation or rational communication, where dialogue and the use of rational judgment decide the outcome. The objective is to convince the other participants through rational argumentation, and come to agreement. This demands equality and symmetry between the partners, as genuine conversion demands that the others accept one's argument as valid on autonomous grounds (Eriksen and Weigård 1999). As I see it, the deliberative democracy is connected to the participatory democracy, and can function as the procedures to be used within such a democracy.

There is a wide range of other types of democracies described, but I have found this outline suitable for my purposes. Sono (1993) claims that the term democracy is used widely, and maybe uncritically, in various situations. He criticizes this, as he finds that the understanding of the term democracy has been redefined, to the extent that one can call just about everything a democracy. This confusion makes criticism difficult, and therefore it is of great importance to be clear on what one understands by democracy (Sono 1993:2-5). Even if democracy as it was originally intended does not exist today, we still have ideals connected to governance, and these are often described as democracy. Since democracy is put forward as an ideal in the present debates, we need to define it, and since it no longer exists in its form of origin, it seems appropriate to redefine the term according to the present context. I attempt to offer a definition of the term for the use of this thesis, but first I need to take a closer look at the African context; its democratic characteristics; its ability to further democratization; and the problems of a pure transfer of the Western-type, liberal democracy.

5.2 Democracy and the traditional African societies

There are continuous discussions of the extent to which the traditional, pre-colonial African societies can be said to have had democratic features, and how this tradition and culture influence the possibilities for the rooting of democratic systems in the present Africa. In the following, some of the characteristics of the indigenous African societies are addressed, and I investigate how this interrelates with the Western democratic ideal. I know, of course, that I am now moving into a difficult area. There is not *one* traditional African society. Earlier, as now, there were differences along geographical, cultural and religious lines, and one needs to be careful not to end up with an over-simplistic outline. My intentions are, however, not to give a complete picture of the traditional African societies, but rather to provide a simplistic backdrop to their democratic tendencies, and also to discuss the problems related to the pure transfer of a Western, liberal democracy to Africa.

5.2.1 Communality and consensus

Even though I have argued that the Mozambicans lack democratic experience as we view it in the West, some of the pre-colonial, traditional African societies hold several characteristics which can be said to have been democratic. A tradition discussed by Sono is *kikuyu*, a system of government in Africa prior to colonization. Sono (1993:49) holds that this system, to some extent, was democratic. It had a fairly democratic structure, with the *family unit* as the starting point. The heads of some of the families constituted the *village council*, where the oldest was elected president. These councils normally consisted of men only, which is of course an undemocratic trait. The group of presidents represented the villages in the government. There was also a *district council*, comprised of all the elders in the district. A group (*ndundu*) of the senior elders presided, and the oldest and presumably wisest was elected president. The fourth and last level was the *national council*, made up of the different *ndundu*'s, and representing the whole population. The system was based on no inheritable positions, and representatives that behaved contrary to accepted conduct could be dismissed. The representative talked on behalf of his group, and the system was entirely based on merit: "Collectivism was the norm, individualism was frowned upon" (Sono 1993:49). I see this tradition of communality as opposed to the individualistic, liberal democracy. Ake (1993:243) emphasizes the collective structure of the African traditional societies.

Their communal character is apparent as Africans rather see themselves as social beings, and not as much as individuals in competition, with conflicting interests from each other. Participation is important not because one need to get one's individual interests affirmed, but because one should take part, show solidarity and share the burdens and rewards of belonging in a community. The African concept of participation is linked to communality and to the concept of being part of an organic whole (Ake 1993). Here, the concept of *ubuntu* is central. It represents a cultural world-view that intends to explain the essence of what it means to be human: "a person becomes a human being through his/her relation to other people" (Brock-Utne 2004:115). Brock-Utne (2004) claims that the view on existence as existence through others, and the emphasis on participation and sharing, is in great contrast to the Western individual philosophy of existence: "Cogito, ergo sum".

This brings me on to another democratic characteristic of some pre-colonial African societies -the principle of participation. Kikuyu might also be seen as interlinked to the participatory democracy type. The starting point within the family could contribute to active participation by all on the local level. Sono (1993) claims that public involvement when decisions traditionally were to be made was evident in many early African cultures, discussions and compromises were methods used. The important thing was often to find the middle road, a solution that everyone could agree on, and hence, opposites needed to be blurred (Sono 1993:45). This tradition is termed *palaver*, which stems from Portuguese, and means "word, speech, discussion" (Brock-Utne 2004:115). It is to be understood as conflict solving through negotiation. I see this indigenous tradition both in connection to the participatory democracy and the deliberative democracy in the tradition of Habermas, discussed earlier. The traditional African culture of consensus is questioned, though, and I return to it in the following section.

5.2.2 Deference and authoritarian structures

I have argued that the pre-colonial, traditional African societies can entail democratic characteristics. But in other aspects, they cannot. Reverence and acquiescence is deeply embedded in the African culture. Sono (1993:43) claims that the ancestors play an important and mythical role, making the Elders, who are the closest kins to the ancestors, natural authorities. Aging is a sign of experience and wisdom. The respect

of the elders and the constant reference to the past is thus a vital characteristic of the indigenous African societies (Sono 1993; Harber 1997). In such a society, a person's authority and status is decided from the relative position in the group, and group affiliation becomes important. But this can become a problem, as decisions are to be taken collectively as a group action, like the tradition of consensus and communality prescribe. Hence, Sono (1993:43) argues that group affiliation is not compatible with democracy. The objective of consensus and unanimity is a good one, it is a democratic aim, but the methods used in the traditional African societies cannot always be said to have been democratic (Sono 1993). They resemble an undemocratic, oligarchic system. And in this respect, I am of the opinion that the system of kikuyu can also be viewed as a representative, elite democracy, as power is concentrated to a few men. When the authority of the Elders gets so strong that the subordinates can do nothing but agree, the consensus reached in these civilizations might have been superficial. Agreement is the overall objective, dissent is not acceptable, and consent can be given out of the fear of being different. Sono (1993:42) claims that this is opposed to the Western societies, the civilizations of dissent, where consent ideally is given freely. Consequently, even though some traditional societies had procedures to control their rulers, the normal picture was "more authoritarian, with highly personalized rule, faith in the wisdom and justice of rulers rather than belief in laws and procedures, unequal rights of citizenship and the absence of formal opposition" (Chazan cited in Harber 1997:14).

One might see the contours of a division between, on the one hand, the Western democracy as *rule by law*, laws that can be changed and altered, and on the other hand a *rule by norms*, based in traditions that cannot be changed. The latter is not easy to view as democratic, even though the theoretical outline has illustrated that it entails features that can contribute to the creation of a new, context-adjusted democracy for Africa. In the following I go on to the present African context, which also entails obstacles for democratization, especially for the simple transfer of a Western, liberal democracy.

5.3 Democracy and the present African context

Since the present African context is very much influenced by the traditional cultures of Africa, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between traditional and modern

African societies. The social anthropologist Antoine Lema claims that the values of consensus and reciprocity were preserved throughout the colonial era in the African rural areas. This was seen as a means of fighting against the colonial ideas (Lema 1995:140). There are of course variations between regions and countries, and there are also huge differences between the urban and the rural areas, but traditional culture and beliefs are still vivid in Africa, and still part of the present African context. In the following sections I look at how the present socio-economic situation in Africa plays a role in the context of democratization.

5.3.1 The economic and socio-political situation

When it comes to more recent developments in the African context, the present economic and socio-political situation plays a vital role. Daddieh argues that the African socioeconomic conditions and inter-elite conflicts make the African democracies unstable and fragile, and contribute to the “reverse waves” of democracies falling back into undemocratic regimes (Daddieh 1998:56-57). Ake (1993:241) argues that an African democracy will not be viable and relevant unless it takes the economic component into account. The fight for democracy is very much a fight against poverty. Ordinary Africans see democratization as their political empowerment – essential for getting the economic agenda right.

The political scientist Kidane Mengisteab also claims that the focus on individual freedom makes the liberal democracy unsuitable for the African context. Liberal democracy is often associated with capitalism, and its most important feature is to protect private property and individual freedom. State power is restricted, economic and political decisions are partitioned (Mengisteab 1999:25-26). This is in concordance with the aid approaches, and especially the (E)SAPs’ focus on market liberalism, without taking the social policy into account. In the African context, the state has an important role in redistributing the resources. As long as the liberal democracy does not have mechanisms to redistribute the resources, it will not be a viable system (Mengisteab 1999:26).

The transfer of a Western, liberal democracy has important implications in this respect. The African democratization needs to take care of the interests of its social base. This implies economic intervention in the market place to ensure economic growth and

redistribution of economic wealth (Ake 1993:242). But this can be problematic because the “powerful sponsors- the African elite, Western nations and international development agencies” might see this as the degeneration of democracy into socialism (Ake 1993:242). Their belief in the West, market forces and orthodox liberal democracy, implies that the African democracy will not be given the opportunity to develop in a unique way. Ake (1993) emphasizes that the ordinary Africans are living in a pre-industrial, communal society, culturally different from our societies in the West. Daddieh (1998) claims that one needs to pay attention to Africans’ understanding of democracy, and thus get a better understanding of the political development in Africa. If not, one is in danger of misinterpreting the events, and even missing the creation of African democracy.

5.4 Summary; towards a definition of democracy

The term democracy has different manifestations, and the African context is clearly important in the creation of a Mozambican democracy. But a rule by norms, without possibility to influence and change the traditions that guide it, might not be a desired result. I see it as important that the principles and values originally inherent in the term democracy are preserved, if democracy is to be forwarded as an ideal at all. This chapter’s focus on different types of democracies has contributed in this respect, and has a saying in the discussions concerning a definition of a Mozambican democracy.

The theoretical outline has shown that the Western-type democracy, or more precisely the neo-liberal democracy encouraged through the SAPs, and maybe also the present SWAPs, has obvious limitations for the African context. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that its ideal of individual freedom connected to the importance of human rights is imperative to maintain. This is not to say that individual freedom is not taken care of within the other types of democracies. For instance the deliberative democracy secures individual freedom through the process of deliberation, in the search for the common good. In this I see less conflict between the individual and the common, and this is perhaps more in concordance with the African tradition of consensus and communality. The competitive democracy and party pluralism can also contribute to the democratization of Mozambique, as there are few alternatives to the representative democracy in a modern state. It is however not impossible that this could be executed in other ways than the one known until now, and maybe can African traditions

contribute to new thinking in this respect. I am of the opinion that the values of consensus and communality; the palaver tradition and the concept of ubuntu are important to bring forward and preserve in the process of democratization. I also think that it is important that elections are sustained in a decentralized manner, to prevent elite democracy or oligarchy, a possible outcome of the traditional belief in chiefs and authoritarian structures. Focus on the local level is also a natural outcome of the participatory democracy, which emphasizes maximum participation by as many as possible. This is in accordance with the original Greek democratic ideal, and a necessary component of all democracies, as I see it. I also see the advantages in a participatory democracy as an educational activity, as I do in the deliberative democracy. It puts the dialogue and communication between equals forward as a tool for reaching common decisions, something that I find a suitable ideal for a democracy, and also very much in concordance with the traditions of consensus and communality.

I will nevertheless be careful in proposing any democratic formulae for Mozambique. The main point to be made is that the traditional and present implications of the African context need to be taken into account in this process. I am thus not suggesting a more detailed definition of democracy other than referring to the ideal of *maximum participation by all on an equal basis*. Whenever in the following I refer to “real” or “genuine” democracy, or simply “democracy”, I do not have any static or determined democracy in mind, but rather one that remains to be created, according to the context in which it is supposed to function. My definition of democracy implies increasing democratic experience, as is needed in Mozambique. But this also presupposes that the Mozambicans are informed and educated for participation. Hence, education for citizenship becomes important, and this is what I focus on in the following chapter.

6. EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

Education, and the concept of education for citizenship, plays an important role in the context of democratization. For now, I have argued that education for citizenship is needed in the Mozambican context. But what is this education about? Education might function as a socializing- or reproducing agent, and also as a transforming- or change agent. The democratic nature of education conjuncts these two seemingly conflicting roles. It diminishes the dilemma of the possibly controversial aspects of conveyance of values and criticism inherent in the concept of education for citizenship (6.1). Education for citizenship will include socialization into the political culture of a society, through the conveyance of the values and the culture inherent in that society (6.2). This is important, as education for citizenship plays a role when it comes to nation building, especially in a multiethnic society like Mozambique. The creation of patriotism and a feeling of national identity and unity are essential, and through democratic participation by all, and through dialogue, the hope is that the conveyance of values will not represent a treat to the ideal of a dynamic and changing society. This is emphasized as education is also forwarded as a change agent, through the critical aspect of education for citizenship (6.3). In order to promote a viable democracy and avoid a situation of oppression of whatever kind, it is of outmost importance that education entails the critical aspect. My own view of education for citizenship, for the use of this thesis, and as a basis for later analysis in chapter 7, is finally outlined (6.4). By this I have a basis for further discussions concerning what role education for citizenship can play in *Mozambique*.

6.1 Education and its relation to democracy

Education is viewed by some as a means for increasing the competence of individuals, and thus contributing to reducing poverty and furthering development and growth. By learning necessary life-skills, a person can create herself/himself a living and in that way contribute to the development of the nation: “Inadequate education is one of the most powerful determinants of poverty (...)” (World Bank 2001:2). This mirrors an instrumental view on education as part of the economy, and this is of course an important part of education’s role in developing countries. But education can also be seen as a good in itself; contributing to the individual and personal development, and

providing autonomous citizens for a viable democracy. It is this view that is focused in the following.

In every society, education has been important as a tool for socialization. Nyerere argues that this was also the case for the societies of pre-colonial Africa:

The fact that pre-colonial Africa did not have “schools” - except for short periods of initiation in some tribes - did not mean that the children were not educated. They learned by living and doing. In the homes and on the farms they were taught the skills of the society, and the behaviour expected of its members (...). Through these means, and by the custom of sharing to which young people were taught to conform, the values of the society were transmitted. But this lack of formality did not mean that there was no education, nor did it affect its importance to the society (Nyerere 1968:45).

Normally, it is the school's task to convey the values and beliefs that characterize its society. The educationist Diane Ravitch gives an historical review of education's role in society, and argues that there is a belief that education can shape people's minds, and hence, society (Ravitch 2001:15). Education is created in concordance with the ideologies and beliefs of the politicians to form or maintain the society they want.

But education can also contribute to creating an informed public that can protect its rights: “[T]he schools and their curriculum [were described] not as instruments of organized social control, but as mechanisms by which citizens could arm themselves with literacy and knowledge and defend themselves against the predictable incursions of a powerful government” (Ravitch 2001:17). Through education the citizens learn to think and reflect, and they exercise their intelligence in discussions. Their ability to participate in democratic activities will increase, and the democratic society will improve (Ravitch 2000:28). In this we see education's double role: It should socialize its students into the existing values of society, and also create an informed, critical public through the creation of a critical consciousness. That's why education can be used as a means for both oppression and emancipation, as a tool for reproducing existing structures in society or as a tool for development and change in a democratic sense. This might seem contradictory, but it is at once possible to understand and agree with both¹⁶.

¹⁶ When it comes to the problem of these aspects' contradictory natures, this is of course an everlasting discussion as to the nature of education, and not to be discussed further within the framework of this thesis.

On this background, it becomes vital what kind of education is provided. The philosopher and social critic John Dewey emphasizes that any education will socialize its members, but he claims that education is also a social *function*; it varies according to the social group that it belongs to. The socialization that education brings about will vary in quality and value, depending on the aims of its society (Dewey 1916:94). For this reason, as long as the society is just and democratic; as long as dynamic growth and change is part of its aims rather than sustenance of the status quo; and as long as criticism and debate is also part of its culture; as long as it is political education that is the objective, there are no problems in the wish to convey the values and culture of that society. A society that aims for democratic solutions will also imply a democratic education.

Connected to this is the concept of *political culture*: “the political values, attitudes and behaviours of the general population” (Harber 2002:271), which is influenced by a society’s history, geography and its economic and social structure. The school, as a socialization agent, and a contributor to the creation of a population’s political culture, has a huge responsibility in this respect. The educationist Clive Harber argues that it is important to distinguish between *political indoctrination*, *political socialization* and *political education*. Political indoctrination is the kind one finds in totalitarian regimes, where one single ideology is held as the only true one. Political socialization is education based on some basic values and objectives that are not open for questioning, but where the nature and realization of the goals can be discussed. The latter, political education is education where all political values and goals are open for critical discussions and evaluations. This education functions as a change agent of the existing structures of society (Harber 2002:9). Democracy and education are intertwined and equally dependent on each other, and in this I see a conjunction of the two aspects of education that I have emphasized. These are also the two aspects of education that will be emphasized in this thesis, as education for citizenship.

In the following, the roles that education for citizenship can play are further explored, as the conveyance of values and the critical aspect of education are outlined.

6.2 Conveying values

Citizens of a democracy need to possess certain political values. Harber (2002:272-273) claims that: “The skills and values of democracy are socially learned, they are not genetic. It is therefore important that African schools and education systems play a part in fostering the knowledge, skills and values necessary to promote and protect a democratic political culture”. He gives education an important role in the socialization of the citizens into common democratic values. It might sound paradoxical that one should *convey* values, and I emphasize that it is not of my intention to proclaim the view that it is possible to transfer or passively receive values, or any other knowledge for that matter, through education. With Dewey and Freire it is my belief that values must be internalized in the individual, as all learning takes place through an active process (Dewey 1916; Freire 2000). Dewey states it clearly as he claims that “The required beliefs cannot be hammered in; the needed attitudes cannot be plastered on” (Dewey 1916:13). Hence, as I use the term *convey*, this is not to be understood as a concrete transfer of values, but rather as a recognition of the responsibility that the governors have of contributing to a sense of unity and co-existence between people.

That said; there are of course also vast disagreements as to which values to emphasize. Through the discussions above, however, I have emphasized that the reproductive and socializing aspect of education is present, but not necessarily in conflict to education’s role as a change agent. Nevertheless, this is an issue of difficult balancing. Diamond (1993) claims that values and the whole political culture of a nation often run out of the elite cultures. These elite cultures might be inclusive or exclusive, i.e. they can take mass culture into consideration or not, and contribute positively or negatively to democratization. It is important to keep in mind that within a country there will often be different ethnic and religious groups, with different values and beliefs. Thus, Diamond claims, a nation will always consist of different *subcultures*, and it can be difficult to talk about *the* political culture of a nation (Diamond 1993:5-8).

The Mozambican society is indeed multi-ethnic, and people of different religions and cultures are to co-exist. There are many different ethnic groups in Mozambique; the North is dominated by the Makua; the Sena and Ndau are familiar in the Zambezi valley; and the Tsonga and Shangaan dominate in southern Mozambique. There are also other indigenous groups, and in addition, there are Europeans, Euro-Africans and

South Asians present in Mozambique. The variety of religions mirrors the multi-ethnic character of the Mozambican society as well: There are about 30% Christians and 17% Muslims in Mozambique, and 45% of the population have indigenous African and other beliefs (U.S. Department of State 2004). In this setting it is imaginable that a common basis of values can be difficult to find.

The language situation plays part in this picture as well, as there are various indigenous languages in addition to Portuguese, which is the official language. Not only does this create problems of communication in a common language, but the language situation also has another important impact. Research shows that

(...) Portuguese, the language of privilege in Mozambique, was the parental tongue of almost 70% of UEM [Universidade Eduardo Mondlane] students, and the means of family communication for over 60%. This compares to a figure of 9% in the general population (Sawyers showing to studies done by Mario et al., cited in Brock-Utne 2003:15).

The mastery of Portuguese might become another dividing factor, creating different social classes in Mozambique, and thus contributing to further difficulties in the building of unity. However, to better understand the needs for and justification of education as a value conveyer, it is important to keep in mind that Mozambique is in the process of creating national unity and learning to co-exist after years of war and oppression.

6.2.1 Common values for creation of identity and nation-states

The political scientist Brendan Boyce argues that building identity and unity in a divided society is difficult. He discusses the situation in South-Africa, but I am of the opinion that his thoughts are also relevant in the context of Mozambique, considering the previous facts on the ethnicity of the country. Boyce (1999:236) claims that one needs to avoid both a balkanization with different ethnicities living and developing apart, and a universalism where all ethnicities are assimilated into an abstract nationhood, or maybe even into the culture of an elite. One should find the balance between particularism and universalism. Each ethnic group should perceive themselves as belonging to both their own group and also a nation of shared values (Boyce 1999:236). Boyce argues that “national cohesion should centre on the idea of shared values and ideals” (Boyce 1999:237). But he emphasizes that it is a question of who is

to decide the values to be emphasized, and that nation building should not be an elite process -the participation by the masses is important. The policy of citizenship should imply the creation of a descriptive and critical vocabulary for the expression of the needs of each group in civil society. Identity is created in *dialogue* with others, in struggle with others, and individuals and groups play an important role in the nation building debate. The dialogue between the different groups enables the sharing of new and ever evolving common values and universal principles. Boyce argues that this creates an opportunity to avoid both universalism and particularism, and rather create a “new, ever evolving hybrid culture” (Boyce 1999:241). Dewey also puts emphasis on dialogue and contact between groups as a means of creating a common basis of values: “In order to have a large number of values in common, all the members of the group must have an equable opportunity to receive and to take from others. There must be a large variety of shared undertakings and experiences” (Dewey 1916:97-98).

In agreement with Boyce and Dewey, I am of the opinion that despite how difficult the agreement of a common value basis might seem, this is nevertheless an inevitable and important basis for co-existence in a society. My definition of democracy can be helpful in the process, as participation by all on an equal basis, through deliberative dialogue, can be a tool for this creation. It is not my intention to come forward with any concrete values that I view as the correct ones to emphasize. This is the task of democracy; that with time society should reach agreements concerning its aims and common values. Inherent in the democratic nature is the safety that these values and principles are never statically decided, but can be revised through people’s critical participation. In the following, therefore, I turn to another aspect of education for citizenship; the importance of critical consciousness.

6.3 Paulo Freire’s contribution; the critical aspect

Education’s role as a change agent is connected to its critical aspect; its creation of a critical consciousness. Freire’s writings, such as “Pedagogy of the oppressed” have had major importance, especially on the area of education and development in the third world. His project was connected to adult education and alphabetization as a way out of oppression: “To speak the true word is to transform the world” (Freire 2000: 87-88). The oppressed should learn to see their own situation through critical education springing out of their own local context. Freire’s writings are contextually bound to

the special conditions of his time and background, and when he uses the term “oppressed” it might seem drastic applied to our context. But oppression might take many forms; it is not necessarily a relationship between a personalized oppressor and the powerless, the oppressed. Freire’s program gives education an important role in the development of a society: “The special contribution of the educator to the birth of the new society would have to be a critical education which could help to form critical attitudes (...)” (Freire 1974:32). Critical education produces a basic condition for democratization. It enables the people to discuss problems of their context and participate critically.

6.3.1 Fear of freedom and culture of silence

Freire holds that in the state of oppression, the oppressed have internalized the consciousness of the oppressors. They cannot see the oppressors as outside of themselves, but rather identify with them, and can therefore not engage in the struggle to overcome this adhesion. The identification with the oppressor leads to the *fear of freedom*, as Freire calls it: “The oppressed, having internalized the image of the oppressor and adopted his guidelines, are fearful of freedom. Freedom would require them to eject this image and replace it with autonomy and responsibility” (Freire 2000:47). The fear of freedom grows in a society characterized by a *culture of silence*. The oppressors silence the oppressed by making them internalize negative self-images. The oppressed are not capable of responding to the culture enforced on them, but remain in a situation where they believe that they have no voice, that they are not in control, but merely have to accept whatever happens to them as beyond their power of influence. They are incapable of taking responsibility and remain with their fear of freedom (Freire 2000). One might view this as characteristics of any society marked by any kind of oppression. Hence, one might as well see this in connection to the Western society and the apathy described by Pateman in chapter 5. Our own situation might be characterized by an apathy based on the feeling of lost control of one’s life and surroundings caused by the distance to decision power, or even globalization.

6.3.2 Conscientização; the transition to critical consciousness

“Conscientização” (Freire 2000:35) is a central aspect in Freire’s philosophy. This is the process people go through when developing critical consciousness. Freire holds that the oppressed hold a state of “semi-intransitive consciousness” (Freire 1974:17). They cannot apprehend problems outside their sphere of biological necessity; they are concerned about survival only. But as the oppressed go into a stage where they are able to understand and react on their context, they become “transitive” (Freire 1974:17). They become engaged in their existence, in the dialogue between people and the world. There is however, an initial stage before this one, and Freire calls this the “naïve transitivity” (Freire 1974:18). This stage is characterized by an oversimplification of problems, by nostalgia for the past, by not being critical, and by magical explanations. This consciousness might result in fanaticism, if it is not led into critical transitive consciousness. Freire explains the stage of critical transition by its depth in the interpretation of problems, that one is willing to test and revise one’s findings and to accept (only) what is valid. As people understand and grasp the causality of things, their understanding of reality becomes critical (Freire 1974:18). Through Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed the hope is that people will develop critical consciousness and be able to understand and transform their reality.

For a society like Mozambique, lacking democratic experience, this is a precondition for democratization. A society that is not trained in dialogue, participation, political and social responsibility, as well as political and social solidarity, the conditions are not satisfying for establishing a democratic regime. Hence, Freire questions the importation of democracy. It cannot be superimposed from one society to another; the context needs to be taken into consideration. Freire outlines the situation in Brazil:

And so we imported the structure of the national democratic state without first considering our own context, unaware that the inauthenticity of superimposed solutions dooms them to failure. Not only did we lack experience in self-government when we imported the democratic state; more importantly, we were not yet able to offer the people either the circumstances or the climate for their first experiments in democracy (Freire 1974:28).

In a closed society, the preconditions for participatory behaviour are not present; the people are not trained for democratic participation. Democracy is a form of life, Freire claims, characterized by critical consciousness (Freire 1974:29).

6.3.3 Criticism of Freire's objective, recognition of his methods

Freire has been widely criticized for his revolutionary visions, which appears to have correct answers of what should be the outcomes. And even worse, these correct answers are to be brought to the masses, which need education to see them. Consequently, Freire can be said to contradict himself, and much of his philosophy can be said to appear meaningless (Harber 1997:37). Harber is of the opinion that Freire nevertheless has made an impact on the understanding of the political nature of education and the urge for critical education, and he argues that this thinking is transferred to today's thoughts on political culture and democratic education. But this tradition does not consider the wanted outcomes of such an education; the aim is not "to educate conservatives or socialists but rather that people should decide their political opinions for themselves on the basis of informed judgement" (Harber 1997:37). The emphasis is on a political education that nurtures critical thinking and awareness of political phenomena, by educational methods that consider a variety of opinions and facts through discussions and exploration (Harber 1997).

Additionally, it is appropriate to ask whether a fundament of criticism, such as it is prescribed by Freire, is a justified demand of the developing countries: Especially as one might question whether this fundament really exists, even in the West. We have a political culture where freedom of speech, debates and hence, criticism are important cornerstones. But would criticism that fundamentally questions and seizes to break down our way of living be accepted, or are the debates in our society limited to the paradigm within which we live? It becomes notable that Freire's philosophy is quite revolutionary, in the sense that he wants a total change of society and the set structures it entails, and this is maybe too much to ask. It is, however, no doubt that his thoughts about the transition into critical consciousness are important in the context of democratization in Mozambique.

6.4 Summary; education for citizenship – my view

In this chapter I have discussed the role of education as both a socializing- and change agent. Education's close relationship to democracy and the values inherent in a democratic society diminish the controversy between education's role as a conveyer of values and its role in emphasizing the critical aspect. Both these aspects of education

will be important in an education for citizenship, and they play a vital role in a democracy. I am nevertheless not arguing that education for citizenship should necessarily be implemented as a special subject in school. It can also be taken care of by other means, for instance through other subjects in school. Mozambique has chosen to provide its citizens with education for citizenship both as an integrated subject in the early stages of primary school, and later as a subject on its own (chapter 3). Throughout the theoretical outline I have argued that education for citizenship plays a vital role in the process of democratization in Mozambique, and that there is a present need for this kind of education. It can contribute to diminish the lack of democratic experience sustained through the era of colonization and the period of one-party regime. It can give the Mozambican people the tool they need to become genuine participants on the democratic arena of their country, and to understand and control the impact that the development aid partners have on the development of Mozambique. I view education for citizenship as *all education that contributes to people's ability to participate in a democratic society*, and as I see it, this is what Harber calls political- or democratic education. I also recon Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed as a good example of education for citizenship, even though one might question to what degree one might demand criticism as part of the political culture. What is important is that the education that is provided for citizenship focuses on common values necessary to build a good society where all can co-exist, and also that it emphasizes critical consciousness for the participation in democracy and further evaluation of these values.

In the following chapter I will outline the analysis of my empirical data, and conclude the discussions of my research questions. This ends in an analysis of which role education for citizenship actually *does* play in Mozambique, according to my informants.

7. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

In this chapter the investigation of my research questions are concluded. In chapter 3 I concluded that Mozambique was a nation lacking democratic experience. Hence, I start out by focusing on my respondents' thoughts concerning the Mozambican society and the obstacles that one might find for democratization, to address my first research question: *What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?* (7.1). In chapter 4 I concluded that the aid relationship has inherent dilemmas, that the partnership is not functioning genuinely as one as its intentions are not fulfilled. I therefore go on to focus on my informants' view on the aid relationship and what impact this has on the democratization process, to concentrate on my second research question: *What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?* (7.2). These discussions provide a basis for the exploration of my last research question, as they suggest that education is needed in the Mozambican situation. In chapter 6 I argued that education can play two important roles in a democracy; as a conveyer of values for co-existence and also as a contributor of the critical aspect for participation in a democracy. I thus close this chapter by exploring my informants' view on this matter to investigate the main research question of this thesis: *Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?* (7.3).

My empirical findings are analyzed in the light of the theoretical discussions undertaken in the previous chapters, and the theoretical findings are compared with my empirical findings from Mozambique. Throughout this whole chapter I make extensive use of citations from my interviews, as I find it important that my informants stand out in the text. This is both due to ethical and methodological considerations, as the citations express reality to a greater degree than my own interpretations.

7.1 Obstacles for the Mozambican democracy

In the theoretical outline, I concluded that Mozambique was a nation with a lack of democratic experience. This will be explored further through the following outline of my informants' view on different obstacles for the Mozambican democracy. When asking my respondents to characterize the present Mozambican democracy, I often got the answer that this was an ongoing process. They emphasized that the process is

steadily improving, and as one of my respondents put it, it is now “gaining roots”. But they also were clear about the fact that there are still many issues to solve before Mozambique can be said to have reached a satisfying level of democracy.

7.1.1 (Mis-) understandings of the term democracy

One of the things that were pointed to by my informants was the fact that many Mozambicans do not know what a democracy is. This could be seen in connection to my outline of the Mozambican people as a people without any democratic experience. Freire (1974) argues that such societies can be characterized by a naïve- or semi-intransitive consciousness that hampers action for change. He calls such a society a closed society, not ready to simply imitate a way of government that they have no qualifications to handle. In this setting, it is no wonder that many of my informants call attention to the need of improving the average Mozambican’s knowledge of the issue. One of my informants emphasized that the problem of ignorance in connection to the concept of democracy was not just a problem for the uneducated Mozambicans, but an issue that had to be dealt with on all levels of the Mozambican society:

Now, the question in Mozambique is not only to teach all the kids in primary education this concept of democracy. Even people like me, I mean, all the people need also to get the message, to learn what we mean by democracy. So this is not an agenda only for primary education, but for everyone!

(Representative for the ministry).

Quite a few of my informants argued that some people had the impression that a democratic society is a society without rules, where everyone can do as one pleases. I have argued that traditional beliefs might have influenced the African concept of democracy. And the cultural issue was also a concern to some of my respondents:

We need the democracy, but maybe not in the way it is applied. Because that we now that in our communities, (...) in a patriarchal community, the men is who has got the voice, so how can you say that everyone can vote, can take decisions for their lives (...). [H]ere the constitution say that we are equal to the law. But when we go down to our practices, to our culture, you find sometimes that it is not just like that. And also there are some places in Mozambique, where who has got the voice is the women, in a matriarchal society. So, these are different settings that we have to have in mind when we are applying this concept of democracy.

(Representative for civil society)

One of my informants from civil society claimed that investigations show that people prefer using the old systems in society. Instead of using the formal juridical system, they go to the traditional ones; the régulos or chiefs that were traditionally appointed by the colonial masters, and this is obviously undermining the formal democratization of the country. Therefore, cultural differences become a problem in connection to the transfer of a Western-type democracy. As emphasized in chapter 5, power is traditionally concentrated with a “chief”, it is a personalized rule, and this makes a democratic system with elections on different levels somewhat difficult to perceive:

(...) [T]he people was questioning last year even the municipality elections we had. They said: “What is this about? We have already elected the head of state, so who is the boss? Is it Chissano¹⁷ or the major of a town like Maputo?” That is extremely important, because in Africa our concept of power is that power is concentrated in someone very important; the king. That is our concept of democracy.

(Representative for the ministry).

Power is legitimized through the person it is associated with, in concordance with the traditional belief in authority. Another of my informants claimed that people believe that they have to be eternally grateful to the person in power, and that one has no right to be disrespectful; that is, to elect someone new. This could be connected to the fact that the Frelimo-politicians in power are the very same as the heroes from the liberation struggle. But it also has cultural bearings:

What I see happen very often (...), is that changing the leaderships, becomes a very big challenge. That’s where the democracy is not very well developed. And I think, partly that has a cultural bearing, that in most of our traditional thinking, the older someone is, the wiser that person is. We have tribes like my own, where the head of the village gets born from the chiefs. (...) Now those tribes have to conform to the modern democracy. And we are still struggling with that. If a political party was formed by so and so, 20 years ago, we have to keep that person regardless of if he is achieving the objectives or not. That’s where we have a problem, that’s where I think our own cultural thinking is influencing what is seen to be the modern type of democracy.

(Representative for the World Bank¹⁸).

¹⁷ The President of Mozambique at the time.

¹⁸ This informant was an African working within the donor community, and through some of her/his statements her/his identification as an African seems to be more evident than the identification as a worker in the donor community. This will also be notable in some of her/his statements later on.

From the democracy-theory discussions earlier, it seems like this is an understanding of democracy that is in coherence with an elite democracy, or oligarchy. In chapter 3 I argued that this elite thinking is also recognizable in the organization of Frelimo, which turned into an elitist party. The process of repatrimonialisation and centralization of power, making the democratic system even harder to maintain, is a continuation of this development, as I see it. This stands in contrast to the competitive democracy where the elections decide who gains power. The emphasis on age and respect for the elders might be a cultural bearing that makes it difficult to apprehend that every 18-year-old should be able to participate in the elections of the leaders. This creates a dilemma of how far one should go in the adjustment to the local context. Not all local beliefs and practices will be in concordance with the democratic ideal.

Another cause for confusion concerning the term democracy, and the present difficulties in adjusting to a multi-party democracy, appears to be people's experience with the one-party regime:

Before, we had one party only. We are living now in a new situation (...). If the people don't know what democracy is, how are they supposed to participate in democracy? (...) [W]hen we had only one party in Mozambique, the people thought it was democracy. Now we have many parties; what is the difference?

(Representative for civil society).

This can be seen as a continuation of a conception of power as something that is statically placed within the reach of a limited number of persons. Frelimo came to power and introduced a one-party regime that lasted for 15 years in Mozambique, and I have claimed that it is questionable to what extent these regimes can be said to have been democratic. It seems to me as if this has contributed to a continuation of the lack of democratic experience in the Mozambican society, and it stands as an obstacle to further democratization.

7.1.2 Undemocratic practices; propaganda and corruption

One of my informants argued that the democracy in Mozambique was at a good state:

The democracy in Mozambique today is good, because it is a process in the democratic society, and what is needed to bring this process forward, is respected. It is respected in the way that it exist bodies that symbolize the democratic play, as for example the political parties, civic organizations and public and private media. This means there is room for everybody to participate, and above all, the main thing is that there is liberty of speech, liberty of press. (...) Each citizen has a means of participation, of being an active citizen, participating in organizations and so forth.

(Representative for civil society)

Most of my other informants, however, uttered a concern for the discrepancy between the expressed democratic ideal, and the actual practices in the Mozambican society. I am of the opinion that this functions as another obstacle to the democratization process in Mozambique. One of my informants from civil society put it as simply as the fact that the people in power, the government, are not in need for any change, it is a better situation for them that things remain as they are. Others considered the campaigns connected to elections:

(...) [W]hen you see the campaign manifests of the different political parties, very few have real issues to offer, but rather personalities, conflicts and historical aspects, which have nothing, really, to do with making me and other citizens think that this party will serve me best. So that has to change, and that will take generations.

(Representative for the World Bank).

As I see it, this way of campaigning is not mirroring a high level of democratic practice, but is rather inherent in what Braathen (2003) calls destabilization of politics. The fact that many of the persons in government are former war-heroes, “antigo combatantes” from the liberating forces of Frelimo, is used in a persuasive manner to convince people to elect them, and as I have argued earlier, people’s feelings of gratefulness and obligation prevent them from taking part in a genuine democracy. The fact that Renamo used to be the enemy, the terrorists, in the civil war, makes the political play between the two major political parties a difficult matter. One of my respondents even argued that the persuasion starts already with the school child:

You see that public instruments are used to favor a particular party. You go into a classroom, and find that, ok, it’s good to have a picture of the president, but what does that mean? It means that these kids will grow up, thinking that he or she is the eternal president of this country, you know? (...)

(Representative for the World Bank).

This citation reflects a situation where one might suspect that propaganda is used as a political tool, and the reminder about the difference between political education and political indoctrination becomes evident. To me, both the fact that these kinds of political messages occur, and that they are tolerated, are symptoms of a society without democratic experience, and maybe even a society characterized by a culture of silence. One of my informants from civil society does however tell me a story contrary to this impression:

During the campaigns prior to the elections a police commandant in one area said that it was not allowed to put up posters and slogans for political parties. One party put up their slogans anyway, but the other did not, to obey the law. The next day people violated against it. From the two political parties one had problems because it did not get to inform its electors. Really, the police was not allowed to do this.

(Representative for civil society).

There exist, of course, politically active and informed people in Mozambique as anywhere else. Nevertheless, to me it seemed like people, to some extent, accepted undemocratic practices that surround them, maybe because it is part of a culture of silence; they see them as outside their own control. In such a setting, there is room for political practices that would probably not be accepted in other societies.

Corruption is a big issue in Mozambique, and hence, it was also brought up during many of my interviews, especially in connection to the Swedish audit report that was constantly mentioned in the newspapers at the time:

It is not, I mean, totally unusual to show receipts, when it is many donors, to show to the same activity, same receipt. That is not only in Mozambique, but also elsewhere. One can take advantage of it when there are many donors, when one has the bilateral.

(Representative for the donor community)

This informant put basket funding forward as a possible remedy:

It is possible that these problems will appear in the new basket fund also, but then the advantage is that there is maybe 8 or 9 donors, so there is more pressure on the government, but also more difficult to abuse money, when one doesn't have that many projects. It will be easier to have control.

(Representative for the donor community)

Even though this informant claimed that some ministers have personal interests in the continuation of different projects, and that the ministry therefore is mixed in its

commitment to the new aid approach, (s)he believed strongly in the SWAp. It seemed like (s)he saw this as a way of increasing the donors' control of the government. In this setting, my informant pointed to the importance of a critical civil society:

(...) [Corruption] could make one think that it is important with complimenting support; (...) it can be capacity building, or support to the civil society, to have a more watch-dog function, so that one has national pressure on the government.

(Representative for the donor community).

Theory outlined in chapter 3 has shown that democratization can be put forward as a remedy for corruption, as a critical opposition is part of a genuine democratic society. Hence, funding civil society and creating a critical opposition in a democratic environment becomes important in the fight against corruption.

7.1.3 Limited participation

An important measure of the degree to which a society is democratic, is whether the civil society and ordinary people can be said to participate in it, or not. Mass culture and participation by all is vital to a viable democracy. The discussions on democracy and my definition of democracy in chapter 5 also emphasize participation. In Mozambique, however, it looks as if this is not yet working sufficiently. During the talks with my respondents we discussed participation in general, but mainly in connection to the policy planning within the SWAp:

It's a process. We haven't reached the point where we are happy with our own government within the issue. We are still in a starting stage, because it is not long ago that Mozambican civil society started to get involved in the discussions on the educational policy. I think, long time ago this was ministry issues, ok? But from some years ago, Mozambican civil society has been trying to be part of it.

(Representative for civil society).

The government representatives were often more reluctant to agree that the participation of civil society was not satisfactory. They emphasized that this was a process; that they were improving, but that one could never say that the level of participation was good enough. But on a direct question from me whether the participation of civil society was sufficient, a government representative answered:

If you hadn't used the word sufficiently, I would have said yes, but then you say sufficiently, I say no.

(Representative for the ministry).

It seemed to me that there were still disagreements between the different stakeholders in connection to the decision on what form this participation should have, and I got the impression that the government representatives were opposed to views held by most of my other informants. But one of my informants from civil society also expressed understanding for the government's role, and emphasized that civil society was not supposed to have decision power:

I think there are different things that the civil society and the NGOs suggested that was not sufficiently incorporated. I remember that we paid lots of attention to the issue of pre-school teaching. And I think this is important. But when you have 40% of the children at school age, still not in the schools, who are we to say that the government has to emphasize pre-school education? We cannot decide! I can only pressure, to make them do it. But, my capacity to decide, it is not mine. The civil society is to see, analyze, criticize, suggest, search, push, but not to decide.

(Representative for civil society)

This informant was coming from an NGO participating to a great extent in the processes within the education sector, and cooperating strongly with the ministry.

Many of my informants from civil society argued that they only had impact on the implementation side, and that they had no influence when decisions were to be made. An informant from the donor community expressed the concern that the inclusion of civil society was not in concordance with expectations and intentions:

I think the government is willing to work with NGOs. The question is how. (...) [T]he donors, not only are we saying; government, you have to work with NGOs, we are also saying, in our own donor meetings, how are we working with NGOs? And, an interesting phenomenon has just come up; (...) we had a report a few weeks ago in one of our donor meetings, which said that the representatives that we appointed are no longer coming. This means that the incentives that would encourage the NGOs for participation maybe may have been misunderstood. Maybe their expectations are different. So, even if you invite them, if they don't see the meaningfulness of spending their time there, then they would just avoid that if they are not coming. So to me, that is where we have to deal with the situation. That is a challenge, for both the donors and the government.

(Representative for the World Bank).

It could be serious if representatives from civil society start to withdraw from the process, because they feel their presence is not worthwhile. Nevertheless, my informants often emphasized that it was better now, than before. An important question is however; what do the different stakeholders understand by participation? For what purpose do they speak of participation?

How can we approach what the government perception of participation is, and what we think as a civil society? (...) Of course donors are also trying to make sure that this participation is actually for participation, trying to push the government to allow more civil society participation (...).

(Representative for civil society).

It seems timely to ask if the focus on participation is only rhetoric that the government has adopted, or if it mirrors a genuine understanding of the importance of participation? Participation is a milestone for democracy, and it is vital that participation from civil society is established with this objective in mind, and not just to please the donor community by adapting their prescribed remedies. For now, it appears that the limited participation by civil society stands as an obstacle for democracy.

7.1.4 Language and democracy

Also the *language issue* creates problems for the participation in, and implementation of, democracy in Mozambique. It seems obvious that a situation, in which a great amount of people do not understand public information, will have a negative impact on the democratic practice in a society. If the political culture in a society is to promote democracy, it depends on the degree of participation of its members. I have emphasized the importance of creating a critical atmosphere, through the participation of all. Social change and a viable democracy depend on this. But participation becomes difficult as the public debate is conducted in a language a lot of people do not understand. A few of my informants did not see the language issue as a problem, but this was opposite to most of the others:

We have problems with the fact that there is no way in articulating in one language, and be understood by all Mozambicans. When the head of the state goes to the parliament to address the information state of the nation, he is only understood by 25% of the population. The other people say: "Ok, the president is talking, but what is he talking about?" And they cannot understand, because Portuguese is completely strange.

(Representative for the ministry).

When in addition I have drawn attention to the fact that the mastery of the Portuguese language is increasingly becoming a factor for division of social classes in Mozambique, this is indeed a negative development for the democracy of the country and a decrease in the opportunity for participation by all on an equal basis.

At the same time one informant from civil society argued that this was no problem, that most people spoke Portuguese, and that they were no also implementing local languages at school. Another informant from civil society emphasized that colonization is an inevitable historical fact, and that Portuguese is now important as a lingua franca for the development of Mozambique. The Mozambican democracy needs a common language for communication, for dialogue and debates, and Portuguese might be the best choice among many bad alternatives.

7.1.5 Poverty

Another obstacle for the implementation of democracy in Mozambique, frequently mentioned by my respondents, was the lack of available *resources*. I discussed this issue in chapter 5, how the economic situation in Africa interfered in the process of democratization, and how important it is to bring the problem of poverty reduction into the democratization process. One of my informants claimed that the lack of resources and the degree of poverty might influence the concept that people have of democracy:

(...) I see a correlation between poverty, the level of illiteracy, which is very pronounced in Mozambique, and the way that we understand democracy. Our effort should actually be in the sense of fighting against poverty, by prioritizing education. Because with educated people, I think Mozambique will be able to increase our economic growth, and therefore will improve our concept of democracy. But, in the current situation it will be extremely difficult, I think.

(Representative for the ministry).

My informant seems to think that fighting poverty and increasing economic growth would contribute to improving the Mozambicans' concept of democracy. It seems doubtful that improved living-conditions would automatically imply that people would get a better concept of democracy. But my informant also emphasized education in this picture. I would think that education is vital for people's understanding of democracy; both through the role that education plays in enlightening people, through the conveyance of values and the creation of a critical consciousness, and maybe also as an agent for economic growth. Another interpretation of this citation might be the impact that poverty has on the self-confidence of people. People's belief in themselves as a democratic self-governing body is not nourished in a state of constant poverty. Participation is connected to self-confidence, as I see it, and it might be essential to solve the socio-political issues before people can believe in their own abilities to rule. This can be seen in connection to thoughts of Freire (2000) about the fear of freedom; the oppressed's internalization of a negative self-image, making them believe in it, and becoming incapable of self-government.

There are also other impacts of poverty connected to democratization. My informants emphasized that it was often not possible to choose the best, or most "correct", democratic solution, because the resources are not there to fulfil the requirements:

(...) [S]ometimes from the outside, they would like to see problems solved similarly as what they do in Europe and so on. And in those cases, we have problems. (...) [I]f someone comes and (...) speaks about right to education, but we have no place to let all children go to school. He speaks about right to have food, treatment in our hospitals, but we have not enough space and human resources in the health field to meet that need. (...) It means that in the field of poverty, it is quite difficult to talk about democracy.

(Representative for a governmental institution).

I have stressed that Mozambique is no exception to the problem of poverty. There are simply neither enough resources to organize things in the most democratic manner, nor to uncover the best solution at all times. This also includes the resources needed to carry out the elections, possibly the most emphasized institution of democracy, and I return to this in the following.

7.1.6 The pure transfer of democracy

When I talked to my respondents about democratization, it was repeatedly argued that when it comes to the issue of democracy, the influence from the West was a difficult matter, and the elections were frequently mentioned in connection to this. They were described as very resource demanding, which was particularly problematic, considering the Mozambicans' seemingly lacking ability to make use of the elections for democratic means:

(...) [Y]ou know, the way you see democracy is totally different from the way I see democracy. (...) For instance in the understanding of the North people, you think that one of the evidences of democracy is that countries are supposed to organize elections from time to time, and that is the expression of democracy. Ok; and we are doing so. Somehow suggested by partner countries and so on, it seems now to be a global culture. But how genuine really is the democracy in Mozambique, if each time Mozambique prepare to have elections, we have to approach donor countries, for them to found the process? (...) How will you really be able to take your own decisions if the money is coming from outside?

(Representative for the ministry).

The competitive democracy with multi-party elections seems to play a limited role in the Mozambicans' present understanding of democracy. But there were also those who spoke in favour of the introduction of the Western-type democracy, at least over time:

I think we still have a long way to go. But I think the ultimate goal is the Western type of democracy, because it has been tested over years, and it would be the ideal if we were to attain close at that. Countries that have tried to do that, have tended to be much more peaceful, and have developed even economically much faster.

(Representative for the World Bank).

This is, however, a view that differs fundamentally from the rest of my informants'. I got an overall impression that there is a need for new thinking concerning the implementation of democracy, and that there *are* problems with a pure transfer of a Western-type democracy:

I am of the opinion [that Mozambique might need another kind of democracy]. (...) I would say it is not different from what is happening everywhere in Africa. You have a democracy that is being copied, and that is not functioning very well. I would say that if we could have the opportunity to look at the democracy that we have, and how it relates to how our people perceive this democracy, then it would be better.

(Representative for Unesco).

The similarity to the description of Freire (1974) of the pure adaptation of democracy in Brazil is striking. The democratization of Mozambique needs to be actively internalized by the Mozambican citizens. As long as they have no experience with democratic participation, a pure transfer of democracy does not seem viable.

This also means that the democratization needs to take the African context into account; the history and culture of the country, people's traditional values and beliefs:

I think we have to define democracy adapted to different realities and cultures. Because there is something that one can say for instance in the North, that this is democracy, and this is the way things should be. But maybe you don't apply that theory blindly in a country like Mozambique, or Malawi, wherever. Because there are differences in the way things work, in the way people think. So you have to take the concept, yes, but you have to say: "Now we have got the common understanding, but how do we apply this? How do each person, or we as a country in Africa, apply this issue of democracy?" Because of course, every person wants to be in a democratic country, everybody wants to have the right to say and do what they think they should do. But we have to have the caution, not to force things from other places.

(Representative for civil society).

The theoretical outline has shown that democracy might take many forms and that a contextual understanding of the term is possible and should be encouraged. Even though I have warned against an undemocratic rule by norms, a Mozambican democracy should be consciously created according to the Mozambican reality and the needs of the ordinary Mozambicans. It seems to me that this is not yet the case in the process of democratization in Mozambique.

The core of the issue is that the Western-type democracy is often encouraged by the external partners:

I think that this democracy we are implementing is not our democracy, as Africans, it is not. But at some time I understand that there is no way for Africa to keep our concept of democracy if Africa is so dependent of the West. And you know that some rules behind the aid have to do with the principle of democracy, good governance and so on. So, we have to adjust to the situation. If who is bringing the food when you are in crisis, because of the floods or because of the draught, is the North, if who is bringing the money for you to organize elections, if who is bringing the money for you to organize your health, education, roads and so on and so forth, is the North, you have to adjust your concept of democracy to the concept of who bring the money for you. So this is the only reason for me, why we have to open the door and to accept this situation.

(Representative for the ministry).

The quote illustrates the problem of aid dependency and conditionality connected to aid, and another of my informants expresses the inevitable, natural link between aid and conditionality:

Again, we have a process that takes time, but we cannot avoid this West democracy, we cannot avoid it because we have no money (...). Objectively, if you give money to support me to some extent, you will also influence me, and my life!

(Representative for a governmental institution).

The problem of conditionality is extensively addressed later. Sufficient to say here is that democratization is not just encouraged, but often posed as conditionality. Apparently, this is in itself perceived as quite undemocratic, and I question whether to introduce a forced democracy will have the desired developmental effect. Aid is given to promote development, and as Linde (2000) has argued, the donors have an agenda and purposes for the money they are providing. Corruption has been outlined as a serious problem in Mozambique, and hence, it is understandable and necessary that actions are taken to secure that the money is used for its intended purposes. It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that there are different views of what the good purposes are, and how to fulfil them. No matter how good one's intentions, it is imperative to take into consideration that others might view things totally different. If not, there is that danger, that the pure transfer of a Western-type democracy will become an obstacle to the democratization of Mozambique.

7.1.7 What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?

In the preceding I have addressed the first of my research questions for this thesis: *What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?* In my empirical data the tendency is that the present Mozambican democracy is characterized by a process that is steadily improving, but nevertheless with great obstacles. Obstacles that were mentioned by my informants are for instance people's misunderstandings of the term democracy, often based in cultural differences from the Western democratic ideal and the lack of democratic experience throughout the history of Mozambique. This implies that the balancing of an adjustment to the local context as well as an emphasis on the democratic ideal and human rights might become

difficult. Even though one of my informants from civil society argued that the democracy in Mozambique was in a good state, as democratic bodies were established and people had the opportunity to participate, this was not the impression I got from my other informants. Quite the opposite, there was a tendency that undemocratic practices like propaganda and corruption were pointed to as evident in the Mozambican society, functioning as obstacles to democratization. Another tendency in my material is that the limited participation of civil society characterizes the Mozambican society today, and functions as an obstacle for further democratization. This was nevertheless seen as an improving process, and one informant from civil society expressed understanding with the government's situation. Even though one of my informants did not see it in that way, I got an impression that the language issue illustrates the fragmentation of the Mozambican society. At the same time it could entail a problem for the transition into democracy, as information is difficult to convey to all in an understandable manner. There was a clear tendency that poverty was pointed to as an obstacle for the possibility to choose the best available solutions, and it could also stand as a reason for a lacking self-confidence within the Mozambican people when it comes to the ability to be self-governing.

Finally, the transition into democracy has been characterized as a pure transfer of the Western type democracy, maintained through the conditionalities tied to aid from the West. One of my informants claimed that the "Western solution" is the best option, but the tendency in my material shows that there is a need for adjustment to the local context. From my informants' statements, I got the impression that such a pure transfer of democracy is not viable, and will function as another obstacle to the democratization of Mozambique. This is also in concordance with the earlier theoretical outline.

As I see it, all these obstacles to democratization are very much caused by the lack of democratic experience in Mozambique, sustained by a history of colonization and an authoritarian regime. There is a need to replace this lack of democratic experience, and I am of the opinion that education for citizenship can play a contributory role in this respect.

In the following, I go on to explore the Mozambican context, and the setting for a Mozambican education for citizenship, as I focus on my next research question: *What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?*

7.2 Development aid partnership; for better or worse?

The development aid partners constitute an important part of the development of Mozambique, and the introduction of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) has been an important happening on the aid agenda the recent years. In my theoretic outline I have argued that there are still important dilemmas concerning the development aid partnership. The focus on democratization is not unproblematic, as the level of local ownership might be questioned within a partnership that is not functioning according to its intentions. It is a vital question how this aid relationship functions in connection to the democratization of Mozambique. In the following this is clarified, as I empirically investigate my second research question.

7.2.1 Partnership

Even though, as I have argued in the foregoing, the participation of civil society might not have been satisfactory, other stakeholders have participated more. The donors and the ministry, in addition to some agents from the civil society, are so-called partners within the Mozambican education sector. Many of my respondents emphasized the joint review mission in 1998, the turning-point of the process of change into a SWAp in Mozambique (chapter 4). This, they argued, created the background for a more holistic and comprehensive policy approach, with the donors from one side, and the government from the other side. They also called attention to the pre-appraisal meeting in 1997, and its joint aide memoir (chapter 4), and argued that this agreement to create a common pool of funds has brought the process forward, towards a SWAp. The term partnership is central in the new approach, and many of my informants saw the introduction of the SWAp as an important first step in the process of achieving a genuine partnership. As one of my informants put it:

I could say that the first ESSP enabled the initial steps in the line which is considered the ideal (...). [O]f course, it still remains some problems. There are still (...) marks of the past. It means that it is easier to work separately, in the project way, rather than to work towards a global vision.

(Representative for a governmental institution).

But many of my informants argued that already with the introduction of the SWAp, the partners experienced difficulties. One of my informants from the donor community claimed that the change into a sector wide approach was a shock even to some donors. One representative for the ministry agrees, as (s)he affirms that:

(...) [L]et me say that it was not an easy process. The main difficulty was to bring all the donors on board. That has shown to be a very complex, sensitive and difficult exercise.

(Representative for the ministry).

It appeared to be a problem not only that some donors were reluctant to join the SWAp, but also that the government tended to fall back into the old project approach:

I have seen that government sometimes feels more comfortable to deal with donors individually, so that they can strike deals and get programs going. Because, we have to be honest, especially in the democratic mode of government, where we have the five year mandate, (...) they want to get those quick wins within the period. So if they see the Japanese coming with five secondary schools, they will grab that. And they will not be very happy to discuss that in the donor SWAp. That has happened, and it is happening right here in Mozambique.

(Representative for the World Bank).

As the citation shows, the government might get tempted to make deals outside the SWAp, to have something to show to before the elections. This creates a situation that undermines the whole idea of the SWAp. Even though all stakeholders appear to be positive to the SWAp and its intentions, there seems to be reluctance in their commitment to it, and it seems like none of the stakeholders were pleased with the progress of the change into the SWAp:

Why does it take so long, given that it is a very good and appealing approach to everybody, to make it work? Because I would say, we are still not there yet, and we are five years down the road. We are still struggling with putting blocks into place for a smooth sailing SWAp.

(Representative for the World Bank).

Most of my respondents did, however, express a continued belief in the process, and argued that the good results were yet to come. It was emphasized that the new approach was in many respects better than the preceding ones, and that it was a process that was brought forward, to fulfil its intentions.

Takala and Marope (2003) claim that the SWAp in Mozambique is characterized by divergent understandings -for instance of the concept of partnership. One of my informants from Unesco emphasized the fact that we are dealing with a cross-cultural partnership:

And the problem with partnership is that you have two cultures. (...) There is problem with uncertainty avoidance. The uncertainty avoidance is very low. You don't want to have risks. In that case you prefer detailed plans, you prefer to see how your money is being used, every piece, and it's a culture. (...) But in another culture, like ours, sometimes details may irritate. Not that people want to use money unwittingly, but there are risks. That is to say, as long as we agree, have consensus, that is not a problem (...). Because each of us have our own ethics, values, and how to react and decide when the times are difficult. I would say on both sides of the partnership, you have problem of preparation for multi cultural partnership.

(Representative for Unesco).

(S)he argued that people from the West are characterized by uncertainty avoidance; they are not willing to take risks, everything must be planned in details, and agreed upon in a written form. This is opposite to the African culture, where communication is different, s(he) claimed:

Our culture, in some countries, we have a type of communication that might not be understood. Saying no is difficult (...), somebody might not say no, not because he doesn't want to say no, but because he knows the consequences of the no. So you judge your response by the consequences that you know it is going to have. You eventually say yes, in the hope that one day you will be able to untie yourself from it. And when you untie yourself, you have your problem with your partners; but you said. So, the communication in our society is more understood in a context, rather than in a one- to-one situation, or written.

(Representative for Unesco).

This creates a situation where problems of different understandings occur, and these problems are in turn dealt with in different manners. My respondent put the problem with the Swedish audit, mentioned in chapter 3, forward as an example of how these two cultures have not been able to solve the problem in a satisfying manner. The donors “blow the whistle”, stop the funding, and then want to dialogue on what

happened, and how to solve it. But the other party is left in embarrassment, and the relationship goes sour. This specific case has had a great impact on the education sector in Mozambique recently, as the funding was stopped, and much time was spent in discussing the matter. It also led to a fragmentation of the partnership, my informant claimed. (S)he argued that this will not improve until the leadership understands the environment they are working in, or alternatively, until the leadership changes. And (s)he maintained that there is also a problem that each country brings its own culture, rules and systems into the partnership:

But, later I think, we looked around, that we found out that maybe each country has got its own rules, culture, program, and it was not so easy.

(Representative for Unesco).

I got information from other respondents as well, that there had been tensions also between donors. One representative for the ministry explained that to them it is important to work with the donors that understand them, and agree with them, so that they can become stronger in negotiations with other donors. From the preceding discussions on the gap between rhetoric and reality when it comes to the slogans of the SWAp, this seems like a good strategy to solve the problem of pressure from the donors. As long as the government finds some partners within the sector, with whom to cooperate closely, they can more easily achieve their objectives when confronted with other partners. In a negotiation climate where there are tensions between the different partners, this can turn out to be an advantage for the local government. One informant from a governmental institution claimed that the issues of discrepancy were solved after the joint mission meeting in 1998. Agreements and disagreements were put on the table, and after that they started to work as a team, (s)he maintained.

This sounds, of course, very straight forward, but I got the impression that the partnership was not a genuine partnership. It did not function according to the intentions of the SWAp, and this will be discussed further in the following analysis.

7.2.2 Cooperation between donors

Increased cooperation can be a tool to rationalize the time and resources spent, both from the donors' side and the government's side (chapter 4). But there is that risk that the donor cooperation gets so strong within the SWAp, that it becomes difficult for the

government to make actual choices and accomplish their own policy. The emphasis on local ownership and partnership might promote a need for increased coordination between the donors, to neutralize the feeling of lost control, which might occur. Many of my informants once again brought up the Swedish audit report as a concrete example of current interest, of what might happen when the donors cooperate closely. It shows how strong the donor power might become in situations of disagreements. The situation was discussed amongst the donors, and the result was serious for the Mozambican education sector. One of my respondents explained:

(...) [T]he donors' reaction (...) was: "Oh! This is a crisis, stop everything else. Let's make sure resources are not going to be abused". That has cost the government, because among the donors we tried to have a unified voice. The illness that has been identified in this Swedish program has symptomized the unforeseen weakness of the system, and the reaction of the donors was to stop everything. Now, we have programs funded by the World Bank, and we have external audits every year, and our external audits just came out, not so many months ago, and they were clean. What reasons do we have to stop the World Bank project? We don't. But the government suffers. (...) [T]he basket has been stopped, because of this issue, so all activities that were tied to this basket, are on a temporarily suspension. (...) Now, if the ministry had plans to use the pool funds to buy materials for this new semester, it can't. You see, it's problematic for the moment.

(Representative for the World Bank).

Whether the actions taken in this particular case were correct or not is not a question to be answered here, but the point that many of my respondents' were making, was that the reaction did not take cultural differences into account, and it was not a good way to encourage continued partnership. The increased cooperation between the donors certainly functioned to increase their power in this particular case. Another of my informants from Unesco did claim, though, that the situation following the Swedish audit report had contributed to improving the situation, and made the ESSP II, the plan following the ESSP I, more credible. (S)he argued that the SWAp, with the harmonization of the donors, and the fact that the partners negotiate the whole plan, gives the donors stronger negotiation power and hence, puts up an increased financial credibility for the ESSP. The Swedish audit has contributed to increase the degree of transparency further, (s)he argued. Here, there seems to me to be a discrepancy in the understanding of what the SWAp is all about. It appears to be two ways to view the SWAp as positive. The SWAp can provide the local government with more decision power and ownership. However, the preceding citation shows that others seem to stress the fact that the SWAp gives the donors increased influence and control, through

increased cooperation and an extended field of negotiation, and that this promotes a more credible policy. To me, this seems to be contradicting understandings. Two such different understandings of what the SWAp is about can impossibly be a good starting point for building a partnership. If a partnership is supposed to be a relationship between equal partners, all intentions should be in the open from the beginning. If the rhetoric of the SWAp is so vague that both these understandings are acceptable, there is a need to revise its intentions. I am of the opinion that if a partner only feels safe in a partnership when (s)he is in control, it cannot be said to be a genuine partnership. And in that case, the SWAp does not function according to its intentions.

7.2.3 Local ownership

The objective of local ownership is one of the positive features of the SWAp (chapter 4). During my interviews it was striking how little civil society knew about the new approach:

Yes, I am not very well informed about this, I think the SWAp is when the donors put their funds in a basket. This basket belongs, I mean, the government controls this basket. So, I am not actually sure about what is going on.

(Representative for civil society).

Nevertheless, while talking to my other informants there was an overall agreement that the educational policy had sprung out from the Mozambican politicians themselves. Some of them also emphasized the basket funding, and how this is contributing to increased local ownership:

When you have (...) [basket funding] the advantage is that (...) we have resources, allocated by the donors, and then, according to our plan of activities, we budget the activities based on the resources that we have got. So this money does not have flecks. That's one of the merits of the SWAp. (...) It is the government that has control, to spend, and to account for it, in an agreed mechanism, an agreed procedure.

(Representative for the ministry).

The Mozambican ownership to the new education for citizenship curriculum mentioned in chapter 3 was emphasized. As my informants put it, the planning of the subject was initiated by an expressed demand from the Mozambican society for education to contribute to the state-building and unifying effort, and I got the

impression that external intervention was not experienced during the work with the production of its content:

I would say that we had no problem, in fact. (...) [W]e have prepared these materials in accordance with our reality. (...) So, in term of imposition, we did not experience it, in this particular case. It was home ground decision.

(Representative for a governmental institution).

There were also clear signals that the concrete content of the ESSP had not been an issue of controversy:

(...) [W]hen we developed the strategic plan we have identified three major objectives; access and equity, which is one; quality; and capacity building. And we have all agreed on that, so all the content is towards achieving those three main objectives. And there is a total agreement amongst all of us.

(Representative for the ministry).

These three objectives were mentioned by many of my informants from the different stakeholders, and I got the impression that these objectives were in concordance with the understanding of all of them. Connected to this, and in concordance with the findings of Buchert (2002), one informant argued that the Mozambicans are now better educated than in the past. (S)he claimed that this is contributing to improve the situation, and making local ownership easier to maintain:

So, today even the external experts, when they come here, they have a [dialogue partner]. He can also contribute, can express opinion, so no expert come and say that everything should look like that. So it comes from them, but it is also clear that they can learn from us. We can exchange opinion, equally. So the situation has changed a lot.

(Representative for a governmental institution).

To continue this development, some of my respondents expressed the need for priority of education on higher levels for the development of the country and its independence:

It was studies in the 70s, 80s on education, where people said, it is enough with basic education, as long as you can produce enough to pay back the debts and whatever. But today we are talking about the links, not only to secondary education, but also to higher. If you want to be self sufficient, you should link higher education to your investigation (...).

(Representative for Unesco).

The prioritizing of higher education is nevertheless not a straightforward process, because even though the ESSP and the new curriculum was introduced by the ministry,

and initiated by the Mozambicans, many of my informants argued that the international partners had had some influence. The EFA process was strong, internationally, and set some standards according to which educational policy should centre. The focus on basic education in the ESSP is obvious, and in concordance with EFA. How this came about, and to what extent this is due to an influence of external partners, is not for me to speculate on. One of my informants from the ministry claims that this was a local decision:

(...) [I]t was clear for Mozambique that the priority would be basic education, not because of the Jomtien understanding, but because internally, the situation analysis recommended us to start from basic education. Because, in a country like Mozambique, where you have high levels of illiteracy; with a number of students in school age population out of the system, it doesn't make sense that you prioritize secondary or higher education, if your foundations are so weak. So, for us it was very clear that basic education, meaning in the case of Mozambique primary education, was to be prioritized. Of course, Jomtien appeared as an opportunity to accelerate the internal understanding on prioritizing basic education. But the decision was not taken because of Jomtien conference.

(Representative for the ministry).

One must nevertheless realize that there is of course that opportunity, that a spoken priority of basic education by the international donors, will make it more tempting for developing countries to follow this line, to secure funds for the sector. I have already pointed to the connection between development aid resources and aid dependency. My informants seemed to express contentment with the level of local ownership. But even though there was agreement on the three objectives of the ESSP, their priority and sequence seemed to be more problematic. Throughout my interviews, there were some aspects of donor intervention that were repeatedly mentioned, and this to a great extent concerned the implementation of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI).

7.2.4 Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and conditionality

In chapter 4 I outlined how the international focus on the goal of universal education for all resulted in an initiative to enhance the process to reach the objectives. Talks concerning this Fast Track Initiative gave me a somewhat altered impression of the level of local ownership. Quite a few of my informants, both from the government and the donor side, emphasized that already early in the process, there was a discussion of whether the FTI should be an integrated part of the Education Sector Strategic Plan

(ESSP), or whether it should be an additional plan. It was important for the ministry that the ESSP was the central document, and they saw no positive effects of having more, parallel plans. Additional plans would only lead to confusion and undermining of the strategic plan. One has eventually come to an agreement of integration of both the EFA objectives and the FTI within the ESSP framework.

There were also discussions and misunderstandings concerning the funding of the FTI. Both government and some donors believed that this would provide the education sector with new resources, but it turned out that this was not the case:

(...) [I]t's still not finalized, by the way. Because in a way there was kind of a misunderstanding, the government of Mozambique first understood that these would be completely new resources. But they are not new resources, they are existing ones. What they are asking to do is to redirect the resources to the FTI priorities. And there, there are some disagreements. And even the donors misunderstood the things.

(Representative for Unesco).

In addition to these early disagreements at the introduction of the FTI, there have also been some instances of what my informants called “detail intervention” connected to the FTI. As I understand it, the donors, and mainly the World Bank as coordinator of the FTI, put forward some demands that were difficult to accept for the Mozambican government. These demands mainly concerned the discussion of access versus increased quality, certain aspects of teachers’ education, and the neglect of secondary education. One informant from the ministry explained quite clearly why the discussions of *quality versus access* were important to the government:

The government's point at that time was that there is no way in Mozambique to say that: “Well, we will be concentrating on quality improvement, and then the issue of expanding access and so on, will come after”. How can we do that in a country like Mozambique with more than 80% illiteracy rate, with only 50% of enrolment rate for kids? How do you say that my priority will be improvement of the quality of education, you know, leaving out a number, a huge number of kids. So, the first point of disagreement was the government policy of expanding access, along with the improvement of quality of education. We had some donors saying; “No, that is not possible”. And the World Bank was very strong on that. And you know that the World Bank is also, I would say, technically very strong.

(Representative for the ministry).

(S)he went on to explain how this created two positions within the donors, with the World Bank on one side, and the others, led by the Nordic countries and the UN-

agencies, on the other side, supporting the government view. (S)he claimed that they managed to bring the World Bank on board, because of the Bank's fear to be excluded from the process. This clearly demonstrates the importance of a strong and decisive leadership during negotiations, in addition to the importance of continuing the cooperation with the partners already in agreement. These are means to create increased pressure on reluctant donors, and it shows that it is possible to get local decisions through.

Another area of detail intervention connected to the FTI mentioned by my informants was *teachers' education and their salaries*. This is an important area that is also interconnected to the discussions of the quality of education:

This is what we want; not being told what to do. Not being told by the donors that for teachers under this category; pay them that. For teachers under that category; don't recruit them to teach. And this was what the Fast Track was getting into. Dictating in very single details of what the government was going to do if they were to achieve. And teacher salaries were one of the problems. (...) And they have calculations that they make, the Bank is very good in that. They made calculations. Their argument is that to have a strategy which is sustainable, you have to limit the salaries, you have to not get the most qualified teachers here, and things like that

(Representative for the ministry).

The FTI, with the World Bank in the lead, wanted to decrease teachers' salaries and recruit less qualified teachers, while the ministry saw this as a deterioration of quality rather than an improvement. I did not get the impression that this issue was solved, but still a matter of concern to the ministry and the universities. Quite a few of my respondents, both on government and donor side, blamed the lack of qualified teachers on the neglect of secondary education, which in turn leads to decreased quality of primary education:

And then we have seen that we have problem with teachers, (...) it means that we should do something for secondary education. If we don't develop secondary education, because you are saying that your priority is primary education, it means that you cannot have enough human resources to meet your need related to primary education. So to solve the problems of primary education, you should pay attention to secondary education. (...) So that is what we need, even if our partners don't immediately understand decisions like that (...).

(Representative for a governmental institution).

This is also the last area of discrepancy connected to the FTI; the dilemma of *priority between primary- and other levels of education*:

There is that risk that other areas may be neglected, because they are not looking at any other levels than basic education. (...) I heard something like, the government should make a commitment, but don't write down the numbers, because I am not sure, commitment that 50-52% of the budget allocated into education, would go into basic education, so the other 48% would have to go into different areas. But I don't understand the rational for it. That's connected to the FTI, and the World Bank.

(Representative for the ministry).

Connected to what was stated earlier about the funding of the FTI; that there are no new but rather a redistribution of old resources, the existence of these conditionalities become even more problematic. Overall, the obvious existence of conditionalities connected to the FTI, makes the earlier stated high level of local ownership questionable.

What is interesting is that even though there are all these conditionalities connected to the FTI, mainly put forward by the World Bank, it seems as if the donors are simultaneously rejecting any responsibility for the results of the FTI policy, all in concordance with Klees (2001). One of my informants from the ministry admitted that this is the case, the World Bank has been asked to be the coordinating donor of the initiative only. The initiative is said to be the respective recipient countries' and their donors'; it is their thinking, and consequently their responsibility. But my informant argued that this is debatable, and claimed that the World Bank is on edge with the others. Another of my informants also considered the issue of responsibility for policy results. (S)he spoke in favour of the independence of the recipient countries, but with an argumentation that is not really in concordance with the partnership rhetoric:

(...) [W]e had the seminar in the past, between donors. One of the issues that was raised, was that we should not get into the, with the ministry. We should let them do their job. Because, tomorrow, you know what happens, if anything fails, we will also be attacked. Let's work together, but they have the primary responsibility for action. And this I think is becoming clear for everyone, that the ministry is the ultimate responsible for education. Others are supporting, and doing their best with this partnership.

(Representative for Unesco).

(S)he maintained that one should leave the responsibility to the recipient countries, as a means for having the donors' backs free. To me, this does not sound as a good

foundation for partnership, but rather reveals another discrepancy in the understanding of the partnership. Instead of promoting the partnership as a possibility for increased, genuine local ownership, as I understand the intentions of the SWAp, the donor community seems to have other intentions as well: Increased donor cooperation can give increased donor control and the focus on local ownership can lead to less donor responsibility. That the recipient government takes responsibility is of course imperative for the promotion of local ownership and empowerment. But as long as the policy planning is done in a partnership, where there in addition are expressed conditionalities from one party, it seems dubious that only one of the partners should take responsibility for the results. I therefore view the FTI as an external influence of undemocratic character. If the government can be pressured by external organizations and banks to make decisions that they do not view as beneficial to their people, I question whether this can be said to be democracy to the individual Mozambican. This stands as another indication of the partnership as not functioning according to its intentions, and I would not call it a genuine partnership.

7.2.5 Lack of trust

Overall, I got the impression that the partnership within the education sector in Mozambique was not unproblematic, in concordance with the findings of Takala (2003) referred to in chapter 4. It seems to me that there are still problems with the introduction of the SWAp, and like many other places, the rhetoric is not yet mirrored in reality:

My personal opinion is that I would say the intentions are good, but our mindset has not changed. I am talking in terms of donors. Because that is where, to me, the problem is. We still want to influence how government does its business in the interest of our headquarters thinking. While the rhetoric is about the SWAp, the mindsets, or maybe the heart is in the right place, but the mindset is taking too long to change. To me that is where we have a problem which I am seeing.

(Representative for the World Bank).

That reality is not in concordance with the intentions is nevertheless no surprise, as I have also upheld in chapter 4. It appears that one of the problems with the partnership within the education sector in Mozambique is that the donors have a need of

controlling the ministry to make sure that their objectives and good intentions are reached:

I think people understand the principal of a SWAp approach. And I think everybody is in favor of the principal. My problem is the implementation of it; it still holds people's minds on to the old system of project support. Let me be clear. In our minds, we are not able to lose control. But that's a very personal view. It's still a way to go, and it will take some time.

(Representative for the ministry).

The continuation of old practices might be closely connected to the high level of corruption in Mozambique mentioned in chapter 3, and maybe also connected to cultural differences within the partnership. As I have already mentioned, there can be understandable reasons as to why some conditionalities are set. One of my informants explains it like this:

In order to be providing funds, the donors need a plan to know; how are you going to do this, what is going to be the priorities, to have a look at your resources compared to your priorities (...). I think the first issue was mainly in terms of allocation of resources, to be able to allocate the use of resources, and to see that these resources are used in a rational manner, and according to the priorities of the ministry, who made the plan.

(Representative for Unesco).

It looks as if there exists a *lack of trust* between the partners, and this does no good for a partnership. One needs to keep in mind that the donors have a mandate in securing that their money is used according to its intentions. It is in this way that they can encourage and secure a democratic development. But it is problematic when the government at times feels dictated by its partners and is not convinced by their suggestions. One of my informants expresses this lack of trust clearly:

Sometimes I have a feeling that [the donors] involve too much in details. Just imagine their weekly meetings (...). Once the strategy is in place, and we have agreed on this consensus, we should leave them to work. But if you are there every weekend, every day, what do you do? (...) It is a lack of trust. You are not confident that they would manage to do what you have agreed they should do. If on a family level, there are people that tell their children they should get clean, maybe one should give the standards of what clean is? (...) I think Mozambique is the only country in Southern Africa, where the acceptance of working with the donors goes beyond what would be called intervention. (...) So I think, this is true, that maybe at some point it is understood that there are too much intervention. And because I don't think, weekly meetings, what do you discuss? What do you discuss!? Always discuss the same things?

(Representative for Unesco).

The high activity by the donors, and also the high degree of intervention accepted by the Mozambican government, stand out as a lack of trust within the partnership. It is obvious that there are issues to be solved before this cooperation can work. It seems like a clear tendency that the development aid partnership within the education sector does not function as a genuine partnership. I am, however, of the opinion that the aid relationship has to function as a partnership, if it is to contribute to the democratization of Mozambique. It is thus timely to ask whether the present SWAp is another obstacle to the democratization of Mozambique, or whether it can contribute to a democratic development.

7.2.6 What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?

In the preceding I have addressed the second research question for this thesis: *What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?* In my opinion, and according to the theoretical outline in chapter 4, there is no doubt that the rhetoric of the SWAp, and its intentions, provide good means for democratization. A holistic approach that sees the sector in a bigger perspective and works towards a credible policy is important. Furthermore, the focus on participation by all, cooperation between partners and local ownership is crucial, and positive for a democratic and efficient development. This is also focused upon by my informants, as they view the process as positive and ongoing, and a step forward for a genuine partnership.

But there are also clear tendencies of difficulties within the SWAp. Some of these difficulties are reluctance in the commitment by the different stakeholders, tension between the donors, and there are also problems with divergent understandings and cultural differences within the partnership. My material also shows a tendency of disagreements on the outcome of the increased cooperation between donors; many argued that this leads to less local ownership, but one of my informants from Unesco also meant that this makes the policy more credible. Overall, this shows two different understandings of what the SWAp should be. When it comes to the concrete discussions of the level of local ownership, there was a clear tendency that my informants from civil society were not well informed about the SWAp and what it was about. The other informants, however, were pleased with the level of local ownership

to the Education Sector Strategic Plan and the national curriculum. They also emphasized basket funding as contributory for increased local ownership. This stands, however, in sharp contrast to the impression I got of the level of local ownership connected to the Fast Track Initiative, where there were disagreements on several issues, and where conditionalities were tied to aid from external donors.

All these difficulties within the SWAp stand as a result of, or they result in, a lack of trust within the partnership. Once again, the tendency in my material shows that rhetoric is not mirrored in reality. The high degree of intervention, and the acceptance of it, shows that the development aid partnership cannot be characterized as a genuine partnership; the SWAp does not function according to its intentions. Some of the interventions might be justified, as one should not prioritize adjustment to the local context at the cost of the democratic ideal and human rights, and the external partners play an important role in stimulating a democratic development. I nevertheless find it timely to question whether this relationship is a good starting point for democratization of Mozambique, as the ordinary Mozambicans cannot trust that the decisions taken are actually taken by their own, elected politicians. The Mozambicans need to be able to control and influence the impact that the development aid agents have on their country. There has to be *equal participation* by both parts in these processes. For that, the Mozambicans need to diminish their lack of democratic experience, and I suggest that education for citizenship is contributory in this respect. In that case, it seems likely that the SWAp can function according to its intentions and contribute to a democratic Mozambique, rather than to function as an obstacle to this democratization.

By now, I have addressed my two first research questions. This has been done to provide a background understanding for the focus of my main research question. In the following one of the potentials available for the continued process of democratization in Mozambique is outlined, as I go on to the final question of my thesis: *Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?*

7.3 Mozambican democracy through education for citizenship

Throughout this thesis, I have theoretically argued that education for citizenship is an instrument of major importance for securing and promoting democratization. I have maintained, both through theory and empirical data, that the Mozambican people are in

need of this education. I have theoretically argued that education for citizenship can play an important role in the process of democratization, in at least two ways; as a socializing agent through the conveyance of values needed for learning to co-exist; and as a change agent through the emphasis on a critical attitude to enhance the political culture of a society. In the following outline I intend to explore the concrete situation in Mozambique, through my informants' statements.

7.3.1 Conveying values for co-existence

The history of war and conflicts was often put forward as important in connection to the democratization of Mozambique. One of my informants from the World Bank told me to feel the atmosphere in the streets of Maputo; (s)he argued that there was no one that wanted to go back to war. The history of war has contributed to a situation where the Mozambican people are very open for a new era, but also to a situation with a nation of people in need of learning to co-exist again:

(...) [S]ome of the innovations have to do with the concept of democracy for our children, the concept of culture of peace, which is extremely important in a country like Mozambique, coming from the conflict. The concept of tolerance, you know, learning to live together, even with people of different opinions, and so on.

(Representative for the ministry).

According to Boyce (1999), the avoidance of particularism and also universalism becomes imperative for a multi-ethnic society like Mozambique. One needs to learn to live together, even though there are differences of opinion:

(...) [F]or countries like Mozambique, which has just come out of war, this is also emphasized, that we have to co-exist. This is our nation, it belongs to all of us, there may be differences of opinion; there are ways of resolving it.

(Representative for the World Bank).

The focus on co-existence was a clear tendency throughout all of my interviews. I have stressed the importance of a feeling of unity for the state-building project. To be able to go into the process of creating an ever evolving culture, like Boyce (1999) prescribes, the differences of opinion must be resolved. From the African tradition we have the dialogue concept of palaver, and several of the theorists used throughout this thesis forward the dialogue as an important tool - it is for instance emphasized through

the deliberative democracy-type. Some of my informants shared this view, and one informant argues:

[It is an important part of education for citizenship to develop strategies of] how to dialogue, how to learn to understand others. (...) [A]nd we also hope not only to discuss those aspects with pupils, with children, but we hope also to discuss those issues with the parents, the stakeholders, the community in general. (...) It isn't easy, but it is possible, to have an open discussion between everybody.

(Representative for a governmental institution).

Connected to the discussion concerning the problems of subcultures and the power of deciding which values or aims to emphasize, the dialogue form, and the objective of including “the community in general”, is promising. From this informant’s statement one might draw the conclusion that participation by all, inclusion of the mass culture, is emphasized. This was, however, an issue only briefly touched upon during my interviews, and from the above discussions concerning the SWAp and participation by civil society, the picture looks different.

Many of my informants expressed the urge for the introduction of good values, connected to the need of learning to co-exist again. On this background, education for citizenship was introduced:

Problems of the lack of values, market economy, these things, meant that the peoples' behavior changed, and values were lost, and it was necessary to introduce civic and moral education.

(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation).

It seems to be a clear belief that education can contribute to convey the values needed. It might appear like my informants view this as a transfer of values to passive students, and not as a preferable, more active internalization of values. The main point, however, is that they argue that common values are important, and should be emphasized. Here, the role of the citizen as a responsible person, doing her/his duties and contributing to the common good, is imperative:

[Education for citizenship] is to develop a responsible citizen (...). The mindsets would have to be (...) much more (...) aware that we are part of a society. And what I do as an individual has implications for other humans and the environment around me.

(Representative for the World Bank).

The emphasis on the closeness to others reminds us of the traditional African culture of communality. The values needed are those emphasized in the concept of ubuntu:

They need to learn to know and respect the diversity of culture and religions, this is very important. (...) [W]e initiate cooperation, toleration, solidarity. Everything starts as the 'I' ends, you, the neighborhood, the people in the neighborhood, and then on the national level and the world (...). It is all the principles of human rights; we also introduce tolerance, solidarity, mutual help, love, cooperation. This all makes part of the human rights, of the democracy, so the child has to create and understand these tendencies.

(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation).

The concept of ubuntu is followed by an emphasis on democratic values and the development of a political culture as part of the strategy for co-existence. Education for citizenship is seen as a means for creating good citizens that cooperate to contribute to a good development for a united Mozambique. This is also evident through their emphasis on education for citizenship as a subject for creating patriotism in the child:

We initiate in the child to have patriotism and high spirit, to value its culture and its tradition, so this we also initiate in the discipline of civic and moral education.

(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation).

Education is important as a socializing agent in all societies, and Nyerere (1968) also argued that this was the case in pre-colonial Africa. But it is obvious that in a country like Mozambique, with a history of war and conflicts, in a state of mal-development, the need for state-building and uniting factors are even more crucial, and this view was also a clear tendency in my empirical material. From the information I got, I am confident that the Mozambican education, through its new education for citizenship curriculum, has the best prospects for promoting a political culture based on solidarity, tolerance and co-existence.

This emphasis on education for citizenship as value-conveying and uniting might not be very surprising. What I do find interesting, however, is how my informants reflected on the critical aspect of education for citizenship; education for citizenship's role in creating a critical consciousness. The theoretical outline has shown that these two aspects of education are not necessarily in conflict, but could be emphasized simultaneously. However, according to Dewey (1916), education's role as a socializing

agent and a conveyer of values can become problematic if the aims of the Mozambican society are not democratic enough.

7.3.2 What about the critical consciousness?

Throughout this thesis I have emphasized the critical aspect of education for citizenship, and the important role that it can play in the process of democratization. I found it interesting to see what my informants understood by the term, and one of my informants from civil society reflected on the issue in quite a similar way to the theory that I have outlined in chapter 6:

Education for citizenship is to know what is your right, your human right, what are the basic rights that you have like a citizen of the country. (...) Many people don't know that eating is their natural right; they believe it is a favour of the government. I think this is the first right, but some people, many people, 90% of the people, think this is a favour from the government, you know, because they are the leaders of the people.

(Representative for civil society)

S(he) also emphasizes participation, and the important role that education for citizenship plays in that respect:

[Education for citizenship] should also make it possible for all citizens to have space in the public sphere. It should inform people about these rights, their rights to vote (...). This means, to me, education for citizenship is participation. It is that the citizen should participate in all decisions and questions. (...) Many persons are bad in participating, because we do not have information. (...) There are people who do not know their rights, because they do not have information.

(Representative for civil society)

Even when questioning the dilemma between unity and consensus for development versus the need for critical citizens, (s)he maintained the focus on the critical aspect:

Yes, but these two situations are necessary, because if you have only one side, building the construction, the better future, it is necessary to be critical. Where we have the critical people, we find the better way to develop.

(Representative for civil society)

Also one informant from a governmental institution reflected on the issue in a similar way:

Yes, we teach the child never to accept everything. Never take everything for granted. So, the child must have a creative spirit, a critical spirit, to know how to criticize. So, to know to say what is the truth and what is a lie.

(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation).

From these statements it could seem like the critical aspect of education for citizenship is taken care of, and that there is awareness concerning the matter. This was, however, not the tendency within my material. I got an impression that many of my informants were reluctant to speak about the critical aspect. I do not know whether this was caused by ignorance, avoidance, or if it could simply be that they did not understand my questions concerning the critical aspect. The tendency is nevertheless that most of them are vague when speaking about the critical aspect, and the conversation often turned onto other subjects. I experienced that questions concerning critical consciousness turned back into a conversation about the subject of co-existence:

In fact, in our subject, our goal to be critical does not necessarily mean to be in opposite to the basic principles. Conversely, we hope through this subject to consolidate the principle of how to live together, even with different opinions.

(Representative for a governmental institution).

In my opinion, this citation shows that the focus on co-existence represses the emphasis on the critical aspect. It can also be said to reflect a quite naïve position, not taking into account the real implications of what the meaning of criticism and differing views actually means. This is also the case with the following citation, which expresses a somewhat simplistic understanding of the issues, avoiding the actual dilemma of allowing different views that perhaps cannot be compromised:

I think that we can have positive and negative critics. So, critics don't have to be solely negative. So what we want to do is; the objective is positive, the "fin" is good. Because the ideas can be variable, but we have to have one unique objective, which is good for all. There are different ideas, in the whole world, people have different ideas, but the objective is that the things are good for all. If you have an idea, another have another idea, and another idea, join all these ideas, and we can be able to construct a positive thing, a good thing. So, I think that the advantage of democracy is the liberty of expression, where you have lots of ideas, so the objective is that all can give ideas for the good ending, for an ultimate thing, for the good for all.

(Representative for a governmental institution, my translation).

This citation expresses the belief in consensus as an ultimate goal. This is of course a noble objective, and could stand as an ideal for democratic practices. But again, this belief stands for me as a quite "naïve" view on criticism and co-existence. It might be

that the wish to reach a consensus is so great, that the ability to see conflicting interests as a problem is not present.

There was also a tendency through these vague statements that my informants went on with explanations and excuses as to why the introduction of the critical aspect was so difficult. Some of these explanations were connected to the previous citations concerning the repression of the critical aspect, and emphasized cultural reasons for the difficulties:

We are culturally based on harmony. And therefore, a conflict is not seen, for example assertiveness, assertiveness may be seen as aggressiveness. Because you may not agree with someone, but you can not be confrontational. So, all this issues should be taken into account when you design a program [of education for citizenship]. For example in your culture, (...) being confrontational is ok. It shows you have been true to yourself, you have been integral, you have been assertive. But in some countries, you need to do it indirectly, to use the stories, the story of the elephant or the king.

(Representative for Unesco)

It seems like criticism might be looked upon as aggressiveness in a culture of harmony, and there was a clear tendency that they emphasized that being critical did not necessarily mean to be in opposition. There was no problem in having conflicting views, as long as the objectives were the same. The important thing was that one learns how to live together, even though there exists a variety of views.

Other explanations were more connected to the concrete situation in Mozambique at present:

Well, when I realize your GDP per capita is, you know Norway is a very rich country, and in Mozambique our GDP per capita is lower than 300 US \$, so it is a very, very poor country. So democracy also, what do you mean about democracy in a poor country like Mozambique? (...) So, what I am trying to say is that given the situation of vulnerability because of the poverty Mozambique is facing, the concept of democracy will not be complete.

(Representative for the ministry).

There seemed to be agreement that there were other issues to be solved before one could focus on the “luxury” of promoting a critical aspect of education. One of my informants from civil society meant that people needed food on the table before one could concentrate on the critical aspect.

Throughout this thesis I have repeatedly emphasized education for citizenship as a tool for the elevation of a critical consciousness within the Mozambican society. I have emphasized the critical aspect of this education, and investigated my informants' reflections concerning this issue. Some of my informants also mentioned the concrete subject of education for citizenship, which is recently introduced in the Mozambican schools. On a few occasions they actually criticized the government and the way the subject had been implemented:

(...) Education for citizenship in itself is a good means of achieving good democracies as one outcome, that I think I have no doubts. My doubts are in the way that we have implemented that, that we don't tend to think in that way.

(Representative for the World Bank).

I got the impression that the subject of education for citizenship was not seen as critical enough. If so, it is difficult to imagine that it will contribute in the desired direction. Connected to this, some of my informants drew the lines to political education, as it was conducted earlier in the form of propaganda for the existing power elites:

For [the government] (...), education for citizenship is speaking or explaining the people that the good situation is the one that we are living in now. You don't change anything, because democracy is this that we are living in now. But if we have the opposition parties, they say, this is not education for citizenship, it is political education. We must make the difference between education for citizenship and political education, (...). In education for citizenship, you must not involve in political issues. You must stay in limit between government and the political; you must stay independent for the power.

(Representative for civil society).

When my informants called this political education, they use the term opposite to the way Harber (2002) uses it in chapter 6. The political education that they refer to is more in concordance with what Harber calls political indoctrination or - socialization. But their point is in concordance with Harber's; they are concerned about the extent to which education for citizenship can be exploited for other means, and this is of course also connected to the undemocratic practices mentioned earlier. A new subject of education for citizenship that does not contribute to a critical consciousness will neither contribute to democratization and changes in the Mozambican society, as I see it.

7.3.3 Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?

In the preceding I have addressed the main question for this thesis: *Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?* It seems like a clear tendency that the education for citizenship in Mozambique will contribute to conveying values for co-existence. Tradition, culture and political history play a role here; the traditional values are deeply embedded in the Mozambican's understanding of the subject. The recent conflicts, the war and the re-building of the country have contributed further to this emphasis, as unity, dialogue, patriotism and common values are of great importance for the rebuilding of the nation, in concordance with the theoretical outline in chapter 6. But this conveyance of values might become problematic, if a democratic objective is not part of the Mozambican society's aims. I have therefore emphasized the critical aspect of education for citizenship. A few of my informants had a strong awareness concerning this issue, but this was opposite to the main tendency within my material. My informants were vague while reflecting on the topic, and they often ended up talking about something else. It seemed to me that the focus on co-existence blurred and repressed the importance of the critical aspect, and this resulted in a somewhat "naïve" understanding of the critical aspect. Their reflections often turned into explanations and excuses as to why this was a difficult matter, and cultural reasons as well as the present situation of poverty were emphasized. Overall, I got an impression that the critical aspect of education got minor attention. It also seemed to be a lack of conscious thinking on the matter. If this does not reflect a fear of freedom or a society of naïve consciousness, according to the terms of Freire (1974; 2000), it does nevertheless seem to be a downsizing of the importance of criticism and the creation of critical consciousness.

It might be that the focus on nation building leads to a neglect of the critical aspect. It is appropriate to consider whether it is realistic and fair to presuppose a critical aspect in the education for citizenship in a country like Mozambique. It might be too great a demand that the Mozambicans should be encouraged to be critical and in opposition, when there is still so much to be done, demanding a unified effort. Herein lays a responsibility for the development aid partners, as it could be that this resembles a justification for certain conditionalities. I have emphasized that Mozambique is a nation that lacks democratic experience. This might have created an environment

where criticism is not natural, and there is therefore also the possibility that people do not dare to consider a situation where criticism would fundamentally collide with the government's view. One might ask oneself if this could resemble the kind of apathy that Freire (2000) describes within a culture of silence, where the people passively accept reality as something out of their control to change.

For this reason, I miss the critical aspect of education, and I am concerned that this lack of awareness concerning the critical aspect might have negative impact on the Mozambican education for citizenship and its ability to contribute to democratization. Some of my informants also criticized the new subject of education for citizenship for not being critical enough. Had the critical aspect been more present, the dilemma of a conveyance of values would not be a dilemma to such a great extent. But as the critical aspect to some extent is missing, one can more easily understand the posing of conditionalities, and why there is a limit to what the development aid partners can accept. The critical aspect of education is important for the political culture of Mozambique, not only in order to control the government, but also to provide a better understanding of the implications of and mechanisms within the development aid relationship.

8. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this thesis has been to explore which role education for citizenship plays in the Mozambican context. In a study like this, clear and straightforward conclusions are difficult to uphold. There are nevertheless some tendencies that I find interesting. First, I will sum up the empirical and theoretical results of the investigation of my research questions, and then I provide some concluding remarks.

8.1 Summary of the investigation of my research questions

When addressing my first sub-question *What characterizes the present Mozambican democracy and the transition it goes through?*, I have support from literature studies when claiming that Mozambique's present democracy is characterized by the people's lack of democratic experience. The colonial era, the liberation war, the one-party regime and the period of destabilization have all sustained this lack of democratic experience, which becomes evident in the present development of multi-party elections. My empirical data reveal similar results: The present Mozambican democracy is characterized by being an improving process, but nevertheless with important obstacles. For instance are people's misunderstandings of the term democracy one important reason for the difficulties experienced in the process. These misunderstandings are often based in differences between the Western democratic ideal and local culture. Traditional beliefs in authoritarian structures and respect for the elders result in an elite democracy where one has to be eternally grateful to the persons in power. I have also found that the misunderstandings of the term democracy are based in the historical events of Mozambique, as for instance the era of a one-party regime has led to a continuation of the understanding of democracy as elite-rule, and to difficulties in the perception of multi-party elections. Undemocratic practices in the Mozambican society are an important characteristic as well. They function as an obstacle to democracy, as my data show that corruption and propaganda characterize the political agenda. An important characteristic in this respect is the limited participation of civil society, as I have found that there seems to be discrepancy in the opinions of how this participation should be sustained. This functions as another obstacle for further democratization. Poverty is the last obstacle to democracy, and my final characteristic of the Mozambican society. My data suggest that poverty might

influence the concept that people have of democracy, their self-confidence as self-governors, and also the extent to which there are resources available to sustain the most democratic solutions. I have argued that these obstacles to democratization, as well as the overall lack of democratic experience, demands information and education for citizenship.

When it comes to the concrete transition into democracy, I first emphasized the term democracy in the literature review. Democracy theorists have divergent understandings of the term, and it can certainly be applied differently to different contexts. There are implications of the African context that need to be taken into consideration when a democracy is to be created in Mozambique, and a more dynamic definition of democracy, bound to take care of contextual differences, is necessary in the present situation in Mozambique. A pure transfer of the Western type democracy is not a sustainable manner of democratization, both according to literature studies and empirical data. Nevertheless, my empirical data show that the Mozambican transition into democracy can be characterized as a pure transfer of the Western type democracy. My informants crave a democracy where the Mozambican context is taken into account. They emphasize that a pure transfer is not desirable, but that aid dependency forces this reality.

Since the powerful development agents play a significant role in this transfer, and contribute heavily on the overall policy agenda of Mozambique, the second research question naturally was: *What characterizes the development aid partnership in this context?* The external partners play an important role in encouraging and securing a democratic development. But my literature studies show that development aid is an issue of great controversies and dilemmas. The new Sector Wide Approaches and the rhetoric of partnership and local ownership are warmly welcomed in this context, and seem to entail positive features that could deal with some of the problems inherent in the aid relationship, and provide good means for democratization. This, however, depends on whether the development aid partnership functions according to its intentions, and reality shows that the aid relationship is also characterized by features that could function as obstacles to a democracy: Democratization is emphasized by the development aid agents as a means of development. But the same agents make use of undemocratic methods in their work, as conditionalities connected to aid have been common, and still are, even after the rhetorical change within the new aid approach.

My empirical data concord with this, as it shows that my informants are positive to the SWAp, and view it as a step forward for a genuine partnership. There is nevertheless also a tendency within my material that the partnership is not seen to function according to its intentions. My data show that this might be explained by the fact that it is a cross-cultural partnership, and cultural differences might lead to divergent understandings and opinions. Other difficulties with the SWAp seem to be disagreements on the outcome of increased cooperation between donors. Some emphasize that this makes policy more credible, while others argue that it leads to less room for negotiation for the government, a questionable degree of local ownership, and a debatable degree of shared responsibility. Even though my informants argued that they were pleased with the level of local ownership, this looked different connected to the FTI. Overall, the aid relationship is not a genuine partnership at all times, but is rather characterized by a lack of trust between the partners. As of now, I am of the opinion that one might question whether the development aid partnership can be characterized as democratic. It is not solely favourable for the ordinary Mozambicans, and one might question whether it functions as another obstacle to democracy. The Mozambicans should themselves be able to understand and control the impact that the development aid agents have on the national policy of their country. The active participation in this process demands education for citizenship.

As I have argued that education for citizenship is needed in the present situation in Mozambique, my last and main research question becomes important: *Which role does education for citizenship play in the Mozambican context?* Through the theoretical outline I have argued that there are at least two aspects of education relevant in this context: Education for citizenship will include socialization into the political culture of a democratic society, through the conveyance of the values and the culture inherent in that society. This is important, as education for citizenship plays a role when it comes to nation building, especially in a multiethnic society like Mozambique. Education is also put forward as a change agent, through emphasis on the critical aspect of education for citizenship; the creation of a critical consciousness for participation in democracy. These two aspects are not necessarily conflicting, but their co-existence depends on the aims of society. In my empirical data there is a tendency of strong emphasis on the aspect of socialization. Education for citizenship plays a role as a conveyer of values for co-existence. The traditions of ubuntu and palaver play a role in

this respect, and become important in a society coming from conflicts and war. Overall, I can imagine that the aspect of socialization and conveyance of common values will be taken care of through the Mozambican educational plans. But the justification of the conveyance of values depends on the aims and values of a society, and since Mozambique is characterized by a lack of democratic experience, and by a range of obstacles to democratization, one might ask whether this justification is present. Some of my informants actually criticized the way that the new subject of education for citizenship was implemented. But the tendency in my empirical data is that there is a lack of consciousness concerning the critical aspect of education. This is in itself an illustration of why the justification of conveyance of values might become difficult. Many of my informants were vague while reflecting on the critical aspect, and it seemed like they preferred to come up with explanations and excuses as to why it was a difficult matter. To me, it seems like the focus on co-existence represses the importance of the critical aspect. This results in a somewhat naïve view on the problems with the existence of disagreements and different beliefs, which might be both an indicator of the lack of democratic experience and also one of the reasons for a possible continued lack of democratic experience, as I see it. The lack of awareness concerning the critical aspect might be a danger for the continued democratization of Mozambique.

8.2 Concluding remarks

Democratization as development aid in Mozambique seems to have inherent dilemmas. The state of the present Mozambican democracy might require that some conditionalities are set, to secure a just development and a viable democracy. Simultaneously adjustment to the Mozambican context and emphasis on local ownership are required for the same purposes. The Mozambican people should be in charge of the development of their own country. They should be able to influence and control their own government, and they should be able to trust that the development aid partnership functions in a democratic manner, according to the wishes of the Mozambicans.

For the Mozambicans to take this role as participating citizens in a democratic society, the creation of a critical and enlightened public is decisive. I have argued that education for citizenship is instrumental in this respect, and I have especially

emphasized the critical aspect of education. This could be the tool that the Mozambican people need in this process, and the external partners play an important role in encouraging and securing this. My material has nevertheless showed that it can be questioned to what degree the Mozambican society is ready for these changes at this point. I am thus not of the opinion that education for citizenship will solve all the problems in Mozambique, or that the critical aspect of education could be forced upon them. I nevertheless insist on the importance of awareness concerning this matter in the situation that Mozambique is in. If so, the critical aspect of education for citizenship might become a tool for the Mozambican people to influence not only their own government, but also the powerful development agents that have such a great impact on their country.

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10. APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Interview guide

Questions concerning the SWAp and the process of making the ESSP:

- Has your organization/institution participated in the process?
- How have you influenced the process?
- Have all stakeholders been included in the process? How do you value this?
- How did the process start?
- How do you find the change into Sector Wide Approach compared to earlier aid approaches? Conditionalities/Power relations?
- How has the cooperation between the government and local institutions functioned?
- How has the cooperation between the donors and between the donors and other stakeholders functioned?

Questions concerning the ESSP and education for citizenship:

- What do you mean should be the goal of the ESSP? Poverty reduction; individual development?
- Does the plan lack any important goals?
- How important is Education for Citizenship for attaining this goal?
- Have there been any changes in the new plan from 2004?
- What do you understand by Education for Citizenship?
- How do you value Education for Citizenship?
- How much is this emphasized in the ESSP?
- How important is the local context in connection to education and education for citizenship; and how do you think this has been taken care of?
- What problems do you see in the fact that the majority of people do not speak Portuguese? How do you view the issue of language of instruction?

Questions concerning democracy:

- What does democracy mean to you? In the Mozambican context?
- Can there be different understandings of the term? Is this visible through the co-operation with the different partners?
- Is democracy a goal?
- How do you evaluate the state of democracy in Mozambique today?
- Which role do you think Education for Citizenship should have in the present Mozambican society? How do you view the dilemma of the creation of a critical consciousness versus education for learning common values?